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In 1989, the European Court of Human Rights became a
beacon of hope for death penalty opponents when it blocked the
extradition of a young German man from England to Virginia,
where he faced charges of capital murder for cutting the
throats of his girlfriend's parents. Although Soering v. United
Kingdom' did not rule that capital punishment in itself
violated international law,2 the European Court held that "the
very long period of time spent on death row in ... extreme
conditions, with the ever-present and mounting anguish of
awaiting execution"' might well breach Article 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, which states that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."' Even though the United States was not a party
to the European Convention, the European Court prohibited a
contracting state from knowingly surrendering a fugitive
where "substantial grounds have been shown for believing that
the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of being
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment in the requesting country."5
For many commentators, Soering marked a "dramatic
'breakthrough' for extradition and human rights on the
international scene."6 The European Court not only took a
strong substantive stand against the "death row phenomenon,"
but it also made procedural strides with its willingness to
scrutinize penal conditions of a requesting state, contrary to
the traditional deference to executive decisions about
extradition known as the "rule of non-inquiry."7 Noting that
Soering was being cited as persuasive authority by foreign
' Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
2 See id. at 40-41.
'Id. at 44.
4 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (Council of Europe)
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].
5 Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35.
6 See John Dugard & Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition
with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187, 191 (1998).
7 Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 36, 42.
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courts and by two U.S. Supreme Court justices, some
commentators suggested that Soering and the international
consensus it represented had the potential to influence capital
punishment and extradition jurisprudence in the United
States.8
More than a decade after Soering, however, the
undeniable truth is that its injection of international
opprobrium into death penalty debates has hardly been lethal
to capital punishment in the United States. Executions proceed
virtually unabated, and federal and state legislatures continue
to expand the number of crimes punishable by death, with
scant consideration of international perspectives.9  The
Supreme Court has refused to take other countries' practices
into account in setting Eighth Amendment standards of
decency," and lower courts deciding extradition cases have by
and large ignored evidence of human rights abuses in
requesting states.1'
But that is not to say that Soering is of no consequence
to U.S. policies on extradition and punishment. This Article
attempts to refocus discussion of the case. The majority of
8 See, e.g., Robert F. Drinan, Will Religious Teachings and International Law
End Capital Punishment?, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 957, 966 (1998) ("Could the new and
adamant opposition of the Catholic Church to the death penalty and the evermore
specific adjudication of the ban on cruel, inhuman or dangerous treatment or
punishment lead to the phasing out of the death penalty? No one can predict, but it is
useful to remind ourselves that, very often, the moral aspirations of one generation
become the binding laws of the next generation."); Laurence A. Grayer, Comment, A
Paradox: Death Penalty Flourishes in U.S. While Declining Worldwide, 23 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POLY 555, 567 (1995) ("Considering the world's steady move towards the
abolition of the death penalty, the United States must reevaluate its role as a global
leader and as an advocate of human rights if it allows the death penalty to continually
thrive."); Michael P. Shea, Note, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in
Extradition Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 119 (1992) ("Soering has had
its most dramatic impact in the United States. This decision has given substance to
vague dicta in prior cases concerning the possibility of applying human rights
considerations to extradition.").
9 See Death Penalty Information Center, Execution Information, at http'J/-
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec.html (last visited April 13, 2002); Grayer, supra
note 8, at 555-56.
'" See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) ("We emphasize that
it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive, rejecting the contention...
that the sentencing practices of other countries are relevant.... [The practices of other
nations] cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the
practice is accepted among our people.").
" See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
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nearly 200 scholarly articles written over the past decade have
read Soering as a case about capital punishment, but as such,
it has affected neither the United States's enthusiasm for the
death penalty nor its ability to gain the extradition of fugitives
from Europe. Read as a case about prison conditions, however,
Soering becomes a much more intrusive basis for forcing the
U.S. government to consider its criminal justice policies in light
of international human rights norms. In Soering, the European
Court of Human Rights weighed the merits of a defense that
conditions on death row in Virginia violated the European
Convention. The next logical step from this holding is not the
per se illegality of the death penalty; rather, it is that prison
conditions outside of death row may also violate the European
Convention. Unlike extradition controversies involving the
death penalty, challenges based on inhuman or degrading
prison conditions affect nearly every extradition and are not
always amenable to resolution by case-by-case diplomatic
assurances or by revised treaty protocols. Given that European
countries have expressed considerable reluctance to extradite
suspected terrorists to the United States despite the security
risks of keeping such prisoners,' human rights defenses to
12 The main obstacles to the extradition of terrorists are the Bush
Administration's plans for using military courts, which might violate the European
Convention's guarantee of an "independent and impartial tribunal," European
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 6, as well as the possibility that suspected terrorists
might face the death penalty. See Sam Dillon & Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Spain Sets
Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at Al. Thus far, Bush
Administration officials have downplayed the potential for difficulties in gaining
custody over suspected terrorists in Europe. For example, Donald Rumsfeld told Meet
the Press, "[W]e have known for years that there are some differences in Europe with
respect to views on capital punishment, and that's fair enough. They have their
countries; we have ours. They can make their judgments. I would suggest that I think
that'll not prove to be much of an impediment." Meet the Press (NBC television
broadcast, Dec. 2, 2001). At the same time, however, the U.S. has signaled that it
would be less amenable to compromise over the extradition of a high-ranking and
culpable terrorist. See, e.g., Minister Warns of Rift Over Death Penalty for Sept 11
Suspect, AGENCE PRESSE FRANCE, Dec. 12, 2001 ("U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft
... refused to rule out the possibility that Saudi-born extremist Osama bin Laden
could be executed if he is captured and sent to the United States."). Even as
speculation over the non-extradition of suspected terrorists from Europe to the United
States percolates, European countries have been streamlining the extradition process.
See, e.g., Kamal Ahmed & Martin Bright, Law Change on Terror Extradition, THE
OBSERVER, Sept. 16, 2001, at 2 ("Britain's extradition laws are to be overhauled.., so
that those accused of terrorist crimes abroad have fewer legal rights to appeal. The
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extradition are more viable than ever for people who make up
the bulk of the extradition caseload, accused of everything from
drug trafficking to telemarketing fraud. As the United States
attempts to organize a broad coalition against terrorism and
inspire the world to engage in a protracted struggle in the
name of freedom and justice, human rights claims against the
United States-successful or not-may prove embarrassing
and damaging. Even as the government mobilizes for a
struggle far graver than, say, the fight against telemarketing
fraud, it will still have to take seriously the mundane matters
of international criminail enforcement.
Part I of this Article discusses the rising number of
extradition requests by the United States, the common grounds
for denial of extradition, and the controversies that such
denials have aroused. Part II examines Soering against this
background and analyzes its scholarly reception, influence on
international and foreign jurisprudence, and lack of effect in
the United States. Part III explores the implications of Soering
for defenses to extradition based on prison conditions: whether
prison conditions in the United States could conceivably rise to
the level of a human rights violation, whether the European
Court of Human Rights would ever stop an extradition to the
United States on these grounds, and how such a ruling would
affect international criminal enforcement policy and prison
conditions in the United States.
I. EXTRADITION IN A BRAVE NEW WORLD
A. The Increasing Importance of Extradition
The "vast majority" of people suspected of involvement
in the September 11 terrorist attacks have been arrested or are
being sought overseas.13 Although the United States has
Government will also announce a 'fast-track' system in an effort to stop endless legal
delays.").
13 See Adam Cohen, Rough Justice, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 30 ("Spain has said
it will resist extraditing 14 suspected al-Qaeda members it has arrested unless it is
assured they will be given civilian trials. Since foreign countries have so far rounded
up the vast majority of the 350 al-Qaeda members the Administration says have been
[Vol. 67: 3
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actively bypassed formal extradition with secret, informal
procedures in numerous cases of suspected terrorists, 4 the war
on terrorism shows unequivocally what has become
increasingly true over the past two decades: that extradition is
an essential tool for prosecutors in the United States. The
rising tide of people and goods across borders and the
ascendance of global technologies such as the Internet have
blurred the line between domestic and international criminal
enforcement. From terrorism to drug trafficking to price fixing,
multinational conspiracies have taken root in the fertile soil of
an ever-smaller world. 5 For technology-driven crimes such as
telemarketing fraud, international boundaries often separate
arrested since September 11-including two more in Italy late last week-the
Administration may be forced to back down and hold civil trials if it wants to try them
in the U.S."); Josh Meyer, U.S. Shifts Terror Hunt to Europe, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2001,
at Al ("Justice Department officials now believe that most, if not all, of the suspects in
the Sept. 11 attacks . . . either are in custody in Europe or are being sought by
authorities there."). See also Sebastian Rotella & David Zucchino, Hunt is on for
Middle Managers of Terrorism, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2001, at Al ("London is clearly the
pivot for networks spread across Europe .... Germany and Belgium have been bases
for the preparation of terrorist teams .... Italy and France have been logistical centers
for fake documents and recruiting along with Spain, a source of financing and a busy
transit point.").
14 See Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S. Behind Secret Transfer of
Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al.
'6 See William J. Clinton, Transmittal of the International Crime Control Act
of 1998 to the Congress (June 9, 1998), at httpJ/clinton6.nara.gov/1998/06/1998-06-09-
transmittal-on-international-crime-control-act.html ("Advances in technology, the
resurgence of democracy, and the lowering of global political and economic barriers
have brought increased freedom and higher living standards to countries around the
world, including our own. However, these changes have also provided new
opportunities for international criminals trafficking in drugs, firearms, weapons of
mass destruction, and human beings, and engaging in fraud, theft, extortion, and
terrorism."). See also Janet Reno, Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate, Concerning Justice Department Oversight (May 5, 1999), at
http'/www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/testimony/1999/agjudic050599.htm ("One of the
greatest challenges I have faced as Attorney General has been confronting the striking
increase in international crime .... The impact of international crime is felt daily in
our communities. International drug trade produces the horrible consequences of drug
abuse .... International financial crime robs Americans of their savings, and exploits
our banks and businesses.... Cybercrime threatens the American financial sectors
and our critical infrastructures as well."). The potential for a seamless international
conspiracy was nearly realized several years ago, when Mexican cocaine traffickers
nearly completed a ventilated and lighted tunnel that ran 1400 feet underground
between Tijuana and Otay Mesa, California. In the summer of 1998, illegal immigrants
reopened the tunnel for several days. See SEBASTIAN ROTELLA, TWILIGHT ON THE LINE:
UNDERWORLDS AND POLITICS AT THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER 161 (1998).
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perpetrators and victims. 6 Even when criminals live in the
same country as their victims, more fugitives from justice have
managed to flee across national borders.'7
Since the Department of Justice's Office of International
Affairs was created in 1979 to facilitate and rationalize
extradition procedures, 8 the number of extradition requests
made and received by the United States has skyrocketed. 9
Well before September 11, American policy makers had
emphasized the rising threat of international crime and the
crucial role of extradition in fighting it. 20 In October 1995,
President Bill Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive
42, ordering U.S. government agencies to intensify
international crime-fighting efforts, and in a speech to the
United Nations General Assembly, he urged "every country" to
endorse "a declaration which would first include a no sanctuary
pledge, so that we could say together to organized criminals,
terrorists, drug traffickers and smugglers, you have nowhere to
16 See, e.g., Report of the United States-Canada Working Group on
Telemarketing Fraud (Nov. 1997), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/uscwgrtf/leg-
al.html. The working group described "boiler room" operations in Canada that targeted
elderly Americans with a range of telemarketing scams. The working group urged that
Canada-U.S. extradition arrangements be examined with an eye to accelerating fraud
extraditions.
IT]he delays which occur often mean that elderly witnesses die or
become incapacitated before a criminal trial can be held. The Working
Group is concerned that the costs and procedural delays for
extradition are often so great that agencies reported abandonment of
prosecutions or agreement to unfavourable pleas in extreme cases.
Id. § 3.7.
17 See White House, International Crime Control Strategy (May 1998), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/press/iccs.htm [hereinafter White House] (noting that
the "ease and speed of modern travel have increased the number of fugitives wanted
for serious violent crimes...").
18 Prior to 1979, prosecutors had to navigate tortuous State Department
channels, and foreign governments had to hire local counsel to file extradition
requests. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the
International Rendition of Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. & POL. 813, 818
(1993).
19 See id. at 817-18 (1993). See also ETHAN A. NADELMANN, CoPS ACROSS
BORDERS: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 342, 464-
65 (1993).
20 Reno, supra note 15 ("Confronting transnational crime requires... an
effective infrastructure of cooperation with other cguntries; we need that infrastructure
to collect evidence of trans-border crime and to bring international criminals to
justice.").
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run and nowhere to hide."2' In an October 1997 memorandum
to all U.S. Attorneys, Attorney General Janet Reno praised
federal prosecutors for "go[ing] the extra mile" to obtain the
international extradition of fugitives. "[Y]our need to obtain
the international extradition of fugitives [is] more important
than ever," she wrote.' Six months later, a report developed by
the Departments of Justice, State, and Treasury outlined a
comprehensive strategy to fight international crime. In a
chapter entitled "Denying Safe Haven to International
Criminals," the report described how the Departments of State
and Justice were aggressively renegotiating extradition
treaties to "seek[] the broadest possible extradition obligations
"23
B. Common Defenses, Uncommon Reactions
The natural consequence of the increased number of
extradition requests is that foreign courts have held more
extradition proceedings and ruled on more of the defenses
commonly brought to defeat extradition.' An extradition
request must meet certain substantive requirements. For
example, the requesting state must have a basis for
jurisdiction that is recognized by the requested state.'
21 William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President to the U.N. General Assembly
(Oct. 22, 1995), at http'//clinton6.nara.gov/1995/10/1995-10-22-the-presidents-speech-
at-the-united-nations-nyc.html.
Office of the Attorney General, International Extradition (Oct. 16, 1997), at
http'//www.usdoj.gov/ag/readingroom/interextra.htm [hereinafter International
Extradition].
See White House, supra note 17.24 These defenses are time worn and well documented. See generally M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Extradition: Law and Practice of the United States, in II INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 191, 229-48 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1999); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 383-647 (3d rev. ed.
1996).
See Liangsiriprasert v. United States, 2 All E.R. 866 (1990) (Hong Kong)
(rejecting a challenge to Hong Kong's jurisdiction in the extradition of a Thai national
to the United States for drug crimes committed in Thailand); BASSIOUNI, supra note
24, at 295; Eric Zubel, The Lockerbie Controversy: Tension Between the International
Court of Justice and the Security Council, 5 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMp. L. 259, 266
(1999) (describing Libya's resistance to American and British calls for the extradition
of Libyan nationals accused of the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am jet on the grounds that
extradition treaties existed neither between Libya and the United States nor between
20021
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Extradition requests must also involve conduct that treaties
recognize as extraditable offenses. Although some treaties list
specific extraditable offenses, most recent treaties follow a
"dual criminality" approach, defining extraditable offenses as
any crime that is an offense in both countries and punishable
by more than one year in prison.
A number of affirmative defenses are also available to
relators in extradition proceedings. Many countries, for
example, refuse to extradite people charged with political
offenses, such as treason, espionage, and terrorist acts not
directed at civilians.27 Civil law countries have long barred the
extradition of their own nationals,28 and several countries
prohibit the extradition of relators whom requesting states
have tried in absentia.29 Pursuant to the "rule of non-inquiry,"
concerns about due process violations, excessive punishment,
and poor prison conditions in the requesting state have
traditionally not been available as affirmative defenses."
As the number and importance of extraditions have
increased, the United States's patience with many of these
common defenses has waned.3' Fairly predictable denials or
Libya and the United Kingdom); Matthew Goode, The Tortured Tale of Criminal
Jurisdiction, 21 MELB. U. L. REV. 411, 435 (1997) (describing Liangsiriprasert).
26 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 388-93.
27 See id. at 502-83; CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE
EXCEPTION To EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE RIGHTS OF
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER (1980).
28 See Dominique Poncet & Paul Gully-Hart, Extradition: Legal Framework of
Extradition in Europe, in II INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 24, at 277, 296-
97; Michael Plachta, (Non-)Extradition of Nationals: A Neverending Story?, 13 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 77 (1999).
BASSIOUNI, supra note 24, at 631-34; MICHAEL FORDE, THE LAW OF
EXTRADITION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 125-27 (1995); Francois Serres & Elodie LeGal,
Defending U.S. Citizens and Corporations in Cross Border Proceedings, Extradition,
Mutual Assistance, and Asset Seizures: A French Perspective, 15 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L.
REP. 299 (1999).
30 See infra notes 62, 165 and accompanying text (describing American and
Canadian cases that follow the "rule of non-inquiry").
3' See Matthew W. Henning, Note, Extradition Controversies: How
Enthusiastic Prosecutions Can Lead to International Incidents, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 347, 367-80 (1999). Likewise, other countries have decried the United States's
refusal to extradite or waive primary jurisdiction over certain high-profile criminal
defendants. See, e.g., Jonathan Weisman, Italian Leader Demands Justice in Gondola
Deaths; D'Alema Appeals for Punishment of Those Responsible; Clinton Reiterates
Apology, BALT. SUN, Mar. 6, 1999, at A, available at 1999 WL 5175073 (describing
how Italian politicians called for a review of the jurisdictional provisions of the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement after a court martial acquitted a U.S. marine pilot charged
[Vol. 67: 3
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stays of extradition in recent years have prompted apoplectic
responses from politicians and the public. Throughout the
1990s, members of Congress repeatedly condemned Mexico for
its non-extradition of nationals, a policy that at times meant
near impunity for drug cartels perceived to be some of the
gravest threats to U.S. security interests. After a French court
refused to extradite murder suspect Ira Einhorn to face
charges in Pennsylvania because he had been convicted in
absentia there, the case became the subject of hundreds of
news reports and a television miniseries, bringing outrage at
the extradition process into millions of living rooms.33 In the
with the deaths of twenty Alpine skiers who were killed when a low-flying plane
clipped a ski lift's cables); Alessandra Stanley, Italian Officials Seek Charges in Ski
Lift Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1998, at A8.
Hearing on the Extradition Case of Jose Luis Del Toro Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources of the House Comm. on
Government Reform, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Rep. Mica) ("Mexico has
repeatedly failed to respect over 275 extradition requests in the past ten years. These
cases include murder and illegal narcotics trafficking. In fact, Mexico has failed to
extradite a single major Mexican drug kingpin. I am concerned that Mexico has become
a haven for murderers and drug lords. And personally I hold great contempt for their
inaction to respect international law."); 139 CONG. REC. H6964 (1993) (statement of
Rep. Brown) ("Now is an appropriate and opportune time for the United States
Government to persuade the Mexican Government to abandon its nonextradition policy
and to come into full compliance with the letter and spirit of the United States-Mexico
Extradition Treaty.... With [NAFTA] before the Congress this fall, now is a crucial
time to impress upon the Mexican Government the primacy of the rule of law, not just
in commercial trade considerations."). Mexico's refusal to extradite its nationals has
also led the United States to use informal means of rendition such as abduction. See,
e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (holding that a federal
district court had jurisdiction to try a Mexican national who was abducted in Mexico
and forcibly taken to the United States).
Recently, Mexican authorities have intensified their drug enforcement efforts,
which have led to the death and arrest of the two leaders of the notorious Arrellano
Felix cartel. See Will Weissert, Mexico Says Genetic Tests Prove Death of Drug Lord,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2002, at A16.
33 Einhorn was a hippie activist who fled to Europe in 1981 after Philadelphia
police found his girlfriend's body stuffed in a trunk in his apartment. Sixteen years
later, investigators found him living in France. In the meantime, a Pennsylvania court
had convicted Einhorn of first-degree murder and sentenced him to life in prison after
a trial held in absentia. A French appeals court blocked his extradition in 1997 because
French law prohibits extradition where there has been a trial in absentia unless a
requesting state makes assurances that it will hold a new trial. Pennsylvania has since
made such assurances to the satisfaction of the French courts, and Einhorn was
extradited in July 2001. See National Briefing: Mid-Atlantic: Pennsylvania: Killer
Returned, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2001, at Al; French Court Rejects Appeal on
Extradition, N.Y. TniES, May 28, 1999, at A18; Craig R. Whitney, France Grants
Extradition in 1977 Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, at A14; Connie Chung, 20/20:
20021
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Samuel Sheinbein case, the chairman of the House
Appropriations Committee threatened to disrupt billions of
dollars of foreign aid if Israel did not violate its own laws and
extradite an Israeli citizen accused of strangling,
dismembering, and burning a teenage classmate in Maryland.'
The strategic and political urgency of international
criminal enforcement has prompted the U.S. government to
take affirmative steps to pressure countries to change their
internal extradition practices. Attorney General Janet Reno
declared that she was "committed to convincing governments
around the world to extradite their citizens." In the wake of
The Fugitive (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 15, 1998). See also Ron Wertheimer, A
Guru and Grisly Acts: The Ira Einhorn Story, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1999, at B15 (giving
an unfavorable review to NBC's mini-series, The Hunt for the Unicorn Killer (NBC
television broadcast, May 9 - 10, 1999)).
34 Israel's Offenses Committed Abroad Act of 1978 prohibited the extradition
of suspects accused of crimes committed while they were Israeli citizens. Within a
matter of days of Sheinbein's September 1997 flight, Robert L. Livingston declared the
possibility of non-extradition an 'outrage" and wrote a letter to Secretary of State
Madeline Albright, threatening to disrupt foreign aid to Israel. David Briscoe, Israel's
Refusal to Extradite Teen Wanted for Murder Could Prompt Aid Review, N.P. (Sept. 30,
1997), at http'//work.nando.net/newsroomntn/world/093097/world6 10021_body.html
(last visited Dec. 19, 1999) (on file with author). For a sense of the awkward position in
which the State Department found itself by virtue of Rep. Livingston's remarks, see
U.S. Dep't of State, Daily Press Briefing (Oct. 1, 1997), at http://secretary.state.gov/-
www/briefings/9710/971001db.html. See generally Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan
I. Edelstein, The Sheinbein Case and the Israeli-American Extradition Experience: A
Need for Compromise, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1999). After the Israeli Supreme
Court blocked Sheinbein's extradition in February 1999, newspapers across the
country decried what they called "a terrible injustice," An Injustice: Sheinbein Should
Stand Trial in U.S., CUMBERLAND (MD.) TIMES-NEWS (Mar. 2, 1999), available at
http://www.times-news.conop/1999/edit1999/edit787.htm, "a bizarre and controversial
decision," Israeli Injustice, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 9, 1999, at 4, available at 1999
WL 7702025, and an "egregious abuseD of foreign extradition bans." Nowhere to Hide:
Change Extradition Law to End Safe Havens for Criminals, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 11,
1999, at A30, available at 1999 WL 3978422. See also Jay Greene, Change Israel's Bad
Law: It Shields Criminals, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 5, 1999, at A22 ("[S]omething is
terribly wrong in this case. The crime occurred on American soil, our laws were broken,
a U.S. citizen was the victim, our judicial system mocked, our relations with an ally
strained."). Sheinbein was sentenced to twenty-four years in an Israeli prison. See
William N Orme, Jr., Israel Sentences Maryland Man in U.S. Murder, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1999, at A22; William A Orme, Jr., Israel Convicts U.S. Teenager After He
Admits to Murder, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A16.
3" International Extradition, supra note 22. See also Reno, supra note 15 ("We
are making real inroads into what had been the greatest problem in bringing
international fugitives to justice: other countries' refusal to extradite their own
citizens. In every possible international forum, I put this issue on the top of my agenda.
And we are seeing results: the first extraditions of Mexicans from Mexico; new treaties
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the Sheinbein case, Israel amended its laws so that its citizens
can now be extradited for trial for crimes committed abroad,
with sentence to be served in Israel. Lawmakers there cited
their unwillingness to make Israel a safe haven for criminals
and to jeopardize the country's relationship with the United
States.36 Numerous Latin American countries have also
changed their extradition practices.37 In 1997, for example,
Colombia, responding to aggressive American pressure,
repealed a 1991 constitutional provision that halted the
extradition of nationals." The Dominican Republic changed its
policy the following year.39 New extradition treaties with
Argentina, Bolivia, and Paraguay mandate the extradition of
nationals. ° Although the U.S. government has criticized
Colombia for not giving its extradition reform measures
in Latin America-with Bolivia, Paraguay and Argentina-that remove centuries-old
bars to extradition of nationals; and promising changes in the laws of countries such as
the Dominican Republic and Colombia.").
36 See Dina Kroft, Knesset Votes to Permit the Extradition of lsraelis: Maryland
Murder Case Influenced Lawmakers, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 1999, at A4, available at
1999 WL 6058423; Nina Gilbert, Knesset Changes Extradition Law, JERUSALEM POST,
Apr. 20, 1999, at 1, available at 1999 WL 9001969. In the first case brought under the
new law, Israel arrested an Israeli soldier accused of participating in the murder of a
teenager in Canada. See Heidi J. Gleit & Arieh O'Sullivan, Soldier Arrested in Toronto
Murder, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 20, 1999, at 2, available at 1999 WL 9012724 ("Weiz
would be the first Israeli extradited since the Knesset altered the Extradition Law in
response to the Sheinbein case."); Adrienne Arsenault, Sunday Report: Another Suspect
Charged in Baranovski Murder (CBC-TV transcript, Dec. 19, 1999).
See Joshua H. Warmund, Comment, Removing Drug Lords and Street
Pushers: The Extradition of Nationals in Colombia and the Dominican Republic, 22
FORDHAMi INT'L L.J. 2373 (1999). See also ROTELLA, supra note 15.
38 Warmund, supra note 37, at 2387-88, 2418-19, n.315. Colombia's reform
efforts were prompted in large part by President Clinton's decision to "decertify"
Colombia as a drug-fighting ally, a penalty that potentially carried severe economic
sanctions. See Benjamin F. Nelson, U.S. General Accounting Office, Drug Control: U.S.
Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges, 1998 WL 250280, at
*5-6 (Feb. 1998) ("Since the initial presidential decertification decision in March 1996,
Colombia has taken steps to address some U.S. concerns, including (1) enacting a new
law allowing for the seizure of drug traffickers' assets, (2) approving legislation
increasing sentences for drug-trafficking and money-laundering activities, (3) signing a
maritime agreement allowing the United States to pursue suspected drug traffickers,
and (4) passing a new extradition law.").
9See Warmund, supra note 37, at 2419 n.315.
40 International Extradition, supra note 22.
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retroactive effect,41 Colombia has extradited more than twenty-
five people since the enactment of its new extradition law.42
II. THE EFFECT OF SOERING ON EXTRADITION AND THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Predicted Aftermath: Change or Crisis
With the stakes for a frictionless extradition system
getting higher and with the United States responding more
punitively to denials of extradition, the Soering case seemed
worthy of serious concern. "Like the proverbial pebble thrown
in the pond," one scholar wrote, "Soering will cause ripples for
some time to come."3 On a substantive level, the European
Court of Human Rights crystallized widespread international
disapproval with American practices and conditioned Soering's
extradition on assurances from the United States that he
would not face the death penalty.4 By forcing the United
States's hand, the European Court gave some legitimacy to the
argument that if the United States were to continue its
41 See James P. Rubin, U.S. Dep't of State Office of the Spokesman, Colombia:
Senate Votes to Strip Retroactivity from Pending Extradition Bill (Sept. 17, 1997), at
http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefingststatements/970917.html ("We are dismayed
and deeply troubled by the . . . vote in the Colombian Senate which removes
retroactivity from a pending constitutional bill which would permit, once again,
extradition of Colombian nationals from Colombia."). See also Warmund, supra note
37, at 2428 (describing Colombian reform measures as "toothless").
42 See DEA Official: Ochoa Extradition Sends a Message, CNN, Sept. 8, 2001,
at http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/09/08/hutchinson.cnna/index.html (last
visited Mar. 24, 2002).
43Richard B. Lillich, Comment, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128, 128(1991).
44 See Holly Dawn Jarmul, Note, The Effect of Decisions of Regional Human
Rights Tribunals on National Courts, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 362-63 (1995-
96) ("It is clear.., that the ECHR's decision in this case did have an extraterritorial
effect on the U.S. domestic law because the U.S. courts could not sentence Soering as
they wished.... It is clear that the rationale used in the Soering case... will have the
effect of the European Convention influencing not only its own members, but numerous
other countries as well."). Cf Mark E. DeWitt, Comment, Extradition Enigma: Italy
and Human Rights vs. America and the Death Penalty, 47 CATH. U. L. REv. 535, 587
(1998) ("[T]he United States will find itself with a choice: either keep the death penalty
at the expense of losing extradition for capital offenses, or join the ranks of abolitionist
nations.").
[Vol. 67: 3
EXTRADITION AND PRISON CONDITIONS
leadership role in world affairs, it would have to conform to an
emerging norm against the death penalty.45 This argument was
strengthened by the fact that Soering inspired a series of
abolitionist decisions in tribunals around the world. The
English Privy Council and high courts in the Netherlands,
'5 See Dwight Aarons, Can Inordinate Delay Between a Death Sentence and
Execution Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment?, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 147,
204-05 (1998) ("If actors and legal institutions in the United States continue to
disregard the views of other jurists in the international community, analysis of this
nation's laws under the Eighth Amendment will become increasingly disjointed from
the views of the world and will not reflect the full views of a 'maturing society' .... )
(citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)); Ursula Bentele, Back to an
International Perspective on the Death Penalty as a Cruel Punishment: The Example of
South Africa, 73 TUL. L. REV. 251, 303-04 (1998) ("In a world where the vast majority
of democratic industrialized nations no longer use the death penalty, the insistence on
its retention in the United States should be reexamined."); Regina C. Donnelly,
Comment, Soering v. United Kingdom: Whether the Continued Use of the Death Penalty
in the United States Contradicts International Thinking?, 16 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. &
Civ. CoNFINEMENT 339, 368 (1990) ("As the movement to abolish the death penalty
continues to grow through both international treaties and foreign law, the United
States must recognize that as a member of the international community, it must begin
to adopt and assimilate international standards when reviewing violations of the
eighth amendment dealing with the death penalty and death row."); Drinan, supra
note 8; Grayer, supra note 8; Tamela R, Hughlett, Comment, International Law: The
Use of International Law as a Guide to Interpretation of the United States Constitution,
45 OKLA. L. REv. 169, 200 (1992) ("The European Court's use of international law [in
Soering] can serve as a model for United States courts to use in interpreting the
contours of the Eighth Amendment."); Keith Highet et al., Jurisdiction-NATO Status
of Forces Agreement-U.S. Servicemen Charged with Criminal Offenses Overseas-
European Convention on Human Rights Short v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, 85 AM.
J. INT'L L. 698, 702 (1991) ("IT]he impact of Soering as part of a cumulative, developing
European human rights process clearly makes U.S. imposition of the death penalty
increasingly difficult."); Lillich, supra note 43, at 143 ("[The Court's reliance upon the
death penalty to undergird the 'death row phenomenon' may well lead to the eventual
reduction in the use of capital punishment in other countries. It is reasonable to
assume that this possibility was one of the major factors motivating the Soering
judgment."); Victor Mayer-Schonberger, Crossing the River of No Return: International
Restrictions on the Death Penalty and the Execution of Charles Coleman, 43 OKIA. L.
REv. 677, 678 n.4 (1990) (arguing that the death penalty is against customary
international law and noting that although the United States, as a non-party, is not
bound by treaties restricting the death penalty, Soering shows that those treaties
affect the United States nevertheless). See also Death Penalty Information Center,
International Perspectives on the Death Penalty: A Costly Isolation for the U.S. (1999),
at http'/www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgintenationalreport.html ("Right now, no other issue
is pushing the United States further apart from its allies and the growing consensus of
international law then the death penalty.... The potential costs to the U.S. will be
measured in loss of leadership and prestige, endangerment of the rights of U.S. citizens
abroad, disrespect for international law and the tribunals which protect it, and a lost
opportunity to be part of a fundamental change in the status of human rights at the
start of the 21st Century.").
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Zimbabwe, India, South Africa, and Italy all took strong stands
against the "death row phenomenon."46 To one commentator,
the cases that followed Soering showed not only an increased
willingness of national courts to look to international tribunals
for guidance (and vice versa), but also an increased possibility
for "normative consistency" among tribunals and thus a broad
strengthening of human rights recognition and enforcement.47
On a procedural level, by weighing evidence of death
row conditions at Mecklenburg Correctional Center, the
Soering Court abandoned the judiciary's traditionally
ministerial role in extradition proceedings for a far more active
one.48 This activism suggested a model of reform for U.S.
46 See, e.g., Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-
General, 1 Zimb. L.R. 239, 240, 269(S) (Aug. 4, 1999) (on file with author); Venezia v.
Ministero Di Grazia E Giustizia, Corte cost., No. 223, 79 Rivista di Diritto
Internazionale 815 (Italy 1996); State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) South African Law
Reports [S.A.L.R.] (CC) (S. Mr.); Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 4 All E.R. 769,
788-89 (P.C. 1993) (en banc); Short/Netherlands, Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] 30
Mar. 1990, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [NJ] 249 (A.H.J. Swart), excerpted and
translated in 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990) (Neth.); Singh v. State of Punjab, All India
Reporter [A.I.R.] 1983 S.C. 465 (India). Although Canada allowed the extradition of a
man who fled Pennsylvania after a jury convicted him of murder and recommended the
death penalty, its Supreme Court nevertheless "looked to the European Court for
persuasive guidance in interpreting the Canadian Charter's similar provision," merely
distinguishing Soering on its facts. Richard B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights
Law Nationally and Internationally: The Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40
ST. LOUIS U.L. J. 699, 705 (1996). See Kindler v. Canada Minister of Justice [1991] 2
Supreme Court Reports [S.C.R.] 779, 838 (Can.) ("As in Soering ... there may be
situations where the age or mental capacity of the fugitive may affect the matter,...
but that is not the case here."). The United Nations Human Rights Committee, hearing
the case pursuant to the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, likewise distinguished Soering on its facts. See Kindler v. Canada,
Comm. No. 470/1991 (U.N. Human Rights Committee) (July'30, 1993) ("[Ilmportant
facts leading to the judgment of the European Court are distinguishable on material
points from the facts in the present case. In particular, the facts differ as to the age
and mental state of the offender, and the conditions on death row in the respective
prison systems."). Significantly, the Canadian Supreme Court has since held that "in
the absence of exceptional circumstances, . .. assurances in death penalty cases are
always constitutionally required." United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 SCR 283, 65
(Can.).
,, Lillich, supra note 43, at 701-02, 711-12. See also Stephan Breitenmoser &
Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L.
845 (1990) (praising Soering for helping to push extradition law out of the realm of
international criminal law and into the realm of public international and human rights
law).
,, See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42 ("The period that a condemned
prisoner can expect to spend on death row in Virginia before being executed is on
average six to eight years. This length of time awaiting death, is... in a sense largely
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courts, which, despite dicta suggesting human rights-related
exceptions to the rule of non-inquiry, had almost universally
declined to hear extradition defenses based on conditions in the
requesting state.49 Following Soering's lead, Judge Weinstein in
the Eastern District of New York scrutinized Israeli prison
conditions in a 1989 extradition proceeding involving a
Palestinian-American accused of firebombing and shooting at a
bus traveling through the West Bank.0 Such a holding was
proof enough for one commentator that U.S. judges had
"utilized and even embraced" Soering.5'
of the prisoner's own making in that he takes advantage of all avenues of appeal which
are offered to him byirginia law."); BASSIOUNI, supra note 24; Dugard & Van Den
Wyngaert, supra note 6, at 189-91.
49 See, e.g., Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960) ("We can imagine
situations where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to procedures or
punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require
reexamination of the principle [of non-inquiry].'). See also John G. Kester, Some Myths
of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1479-80 (1988) (acknowledging
that while the exception had never been invoked, it "has now been widely repeated,
and probably has substantial in terrorem effect on United States officials in deciding
which extradition requests they will endorse."); Jacques Semmelman, Federal Courts,
the Constitution, and the Rule ofNon-Inquiry in International Extradition Proceedings,
76 CORNELL L. REV. 1198, 1203-04 (1991) (describing United States courts' tradition of
adherence to the rule of non-inquiry). Much commentary has been devoted to arguing
that the rule of non-inquiry is out-dated. See, e.g., John Quigley, The Rule of Non-
Inquiry and Human Rights Treaties, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 1213, 1248 (1996) ("The
federal rule of non-inquiry was consistent with international practice at the time it was
developed. Today, however, it is at odds with international practice and as such has
been repudiated by the international community.... The federal courts should give
heed to these developments and reject the rule of non-inquiry."); John Quigley, The
Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on Extradition Law, 15 N.C .J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401 (1990) ("Apart from this issue of [not allowing mere
differences in trial procedures be the basis for non-extradition], it is not clear that a
rule of non-inquiry exists in the federal ourts .... If a rule of non-inquiry exists, it is
inconsistent with human rights law."); David B. Sullivan, Note, Abandoning the Rule
of Non-Inquiry in International Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COIP. L. REV. 111,
131, 133 (1991) ("Soering represents an important international precedent on the
refusal to extradite because of anticipated torture, cruel conditions of incarceration, or
lack of due process at trial in the requesting ountry.... These international examples
demonstrate that the United States needs to do more to protect relators from potential
mistreatment.").
50 Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 414-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Soering
constitutes an important precedent on the refusal to extradite because of anticipated
torture, cruel conditions of incarceration, or lack of due process at trial in the
requesting country. It reflects a persuasive though non-binding international
standard.").
5' Shea, supra note 8, at 125.
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Soering's substantive and procedural innovations
threatened to cause a number of crises for international
criminal enforcement and for U.S. security interests. First,
categorical refusals to extradite certain types of fugitives
risked turning Europe into a safe haven for American
criminals. 2 Second, slowing normal channels for extradition
could have adverse consequences in areas such as counter-
terrorism and could force countries to engage in informal
practices such as abductions, resulting in fewer rights for
defendants facing extradition." Finally, as the Cold War
52 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 ("As movement about the world
becomes easier and crime takes on a larger international dimension, it is increasingly
in the interest of all nations that suspected offenders who flee abroad should be
brought to justice. Conversely, the establishment of safe havens for fugitives would not
only result in danger for the State obliged to harbour the protected person but also
tend to undermine the foundations of extradition."). See also David L. Gappa,
European Court of Human Rights-Extradition-Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
463, 487 (1990) ('After Soering, a criminal can now reduce his or her death sentence to
life imprisonment simply by traveling to a member state of the Council of Europe. This
aspect of the case may present problems in the future for the United States and for
states which are parties to the Council of Europe."); Bernard Robertson, Extradition,
Inhuman Treatment and the Death Penalty, 154 JUST. PEAcE 231, 232 (1990) ("Every
prisoner awaiting extradition to the USA [for a capital offense] is going to have to take
his case all the way up the ladder to see if the European Court of Human Rights will
make the same decision in his case.... If extradition were refused by the Court in such
a case, the prospect opens up on the UK filling up with wanted American murderers.").
5When Congress was debating legislation that would extend the death
penalty to acts of terrorism committed abroad against United States citizens, one
opponent of the measure argued that "the key to getting your hands on terrorists is to
extradite them. And if you have even the possibility of a death penalty, we are not
going to be able to extradite terrorists." 135 CONG. REC. S14,224, 14,225 (1989)
(statement of Sen. Levin). Senator Levin further noted that "the existence of the death
penalty may provide an excuse to countries in Central and South American and
Europe to refuse to cooperate in sending drug kingpins to the United States for trial."
Id. at 14,226. See also Semmelman, supra note 49, at 1230-31 (arguing that any
heightened judicial role in extradition proceedings would undermine American foreign
policy goals); Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Applying the European Convention on
Human Rights to Extradition: Opening a Pandora's Box?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 757,
759 (1990) ("The concomitant policy question is whether applying human rights to
extradition will not, in practice, make extradition too difficult because of the many new
obstacles to it that may arise. This may prove to be the opening of Pandora's box, in
that the impossibility of States using the normal extradition process may lure them
into less 'recommendable' practices such as abduction or disguised extradition."); Colin
Warbruck, Coherence and the European Court of Human Rights: The Adjudicative
Background to the Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1073, 1095 (1990) ("The Courfs
judgment was of considerable disadvantage to the British government, which regards
the effective functioning of extradition with the United States as particularly
important to its campaign against terrorism connected with Northern Ireland. Any
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neared its end, Soering jeopardized the relationship between
American troops and NATO host states. Pursuant to a NATO
Status of Forces Agreement,54 the United States generally
assumed jurisdiction over military personnel accused of crimes.
These arrangements were cast into doubt when the high court
of the Netherlands refused to cede jurisdiction in the case of a
U.S. Air Force sergeant who admitted to killing his wife55 -a
capital offense under military law.6 Citing Soering, the Dutch
court held that the "interest of [the defendant] not to be put to
death takes precedence over the interest of the State to fulfill
its obligations under the NATO Status Treaty."5 7 The Dutch
decision not only threatened to raise tensions between the U.S.
military and Western European countries," but it also had the
potential to undermine the uniform application of discipline
among American troops stationed around the world."9
weakening of the obligation by the United States to return fugitives to the United
Kingdom would be much deprecated."); Henning, supra note 31, at 367 ("U.S. law
enforcement officials have increasingly turned to abduction as a viable alternative to
traditional extradition. If formal extradition is not achievable because of a human
rights conflict,... it could seem that the only obstacles to abduction for the U.S. are
the foreign relations implications."); Kent Wellington, Note, Extradition: A Fair and
Effective Weapon in the War on Terrorism, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1447, 1454-55 (1990)
("[C]onsistent refusals to extradite ... severely impede the war on terrorism.... [I]t
would not be surprising to see those same countries, being denied extradition on
constitutional or human rights grounds, reciprocate by refusing to surrender suspected
terrorists themselves.").
5'Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
5 See ShortlNetherlands, HR 30 Mar. 1990, NJ 249 (A.H.J. Swart), excerpted
and translated in 29 I.L.M. 1375 (1990) (Neth.). See also Kellee A. Brown & Sophia A-
Muirhead, Extradition: Divergent Trends in International Cooperation, 33 HARV. INTL
L.J. 223 (1992); Keith Highet et al., Jurisdiction-NATO Status of Forces Agreement-
U.S. Servicemen Charged with Criminal Offenses Overseas-European Convention on
Human Rights, 85 AMf. J. INT'L L. 698 (1991).
6 See Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 118, 10 U.S.C. § 918 (2002).
" Short/Netherlands, 29 LL.M. at 3.5.
8 See John E. Parkerson, Jr. & Carolyn S. Stoehr, The United States Militay
Death Penalty in Europe: Threats from Recent European Human Rights Developments,
129 MIL. L. REV. 41, 75 (1990) ("The death penalty is a highly visible issue, and the
U.S. cannot benefit in its relations with host nations from additional tensions resulting
from divergent views about the death penalty. As opposition to the death penalty
increasingly becomes to Europeans an aspect of their fundamental sovereign interests,
the U.S. will be forced to make some policy choices.").
See Highet et al., supra note 55, at 702 ("The thread that holds such a far-
flung force together is military discipline-discipline that can be enforced only through




More than ten years after Soering, the predictions that
the case would spur change in U.S. policy or possible crisis
have not become reality. Courts in the United States have
virtually ignored Soering.60 The case appears in a mere eight
published federal opinions-four of which were by Judge
Weinstein,"' whose move away from the rule of non-inquiry has
been decisively rejected by the Second Circuit and numerous
other jurisdictions.62 Two courts of appeals refused to consider
that receiving states will ever-increasingly insulate subordinates from their
commanders in the name of human rights.").
6o Death row defendants have been bringing excessive delay claims for at least
forty years. See Chessman v. Dickson, 275 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1960). See also Aarons,
supra note 45. In recent years, such claims have been termed "Lackey claims," after
Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995), a memorandum by Justice Stevens respecting
the denial of certiorari in the case of a prisoner who had spent seventeen years on
death row. Lackey's excessive delay claim, "with its legal complexity and its potential
for far-reaching consequences, seem[ed] an ideal example of one which would benefit
from ... further study [in state and lower federal courts]." Id. at 1047. After Lackey,
numerous jurisdictions heard similar issues and have nearly universally refused to
entertain excessive delay claims. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 591 N.W.2d 86, 93-94 (Neb.
1999) (listing cases).
61 Of the four, only Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 413-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1989),
can be said to rely in any way on Soering's reasoning. Soering appears in two other
Weinstein decisions as fairly extraneous support for large departures from the United
States Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. DeRiggi, 893 F. Supp. 171, 182-83
(E.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Ekwunoh, 888 F. Supp. 369, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
One final opinion notes that a defendant's extradition from Italy merely precludes a
death sentence and does not limit the length of a prison sentence. See United States v.
E1-Jassem, 819 F. Supp. 166, 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
See Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066-67 (2d Cir. 1990) ("We have no
problem with the district court's rejection of Abmad's remaining argument to the effect
that, if he is returned to Israel, he probably will be mistreated, denied a fair trial, and
deprived of his constitutional and human rights. We do, however, question the district
court's decision to explore the merits of this contention in the manner that it did ....
The interests of international comity are ill-served by requiring a foreign nation.., to
satisfy a United States district judge concerning the fairness of its laws and the
manner in which they are enforced .... It is the function of the Secretary of State to
determine whether extradition should be denied on humanitarian grounds."). See also
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Ahmad: Profile of an Extradition Case, 23 N.Y.U. J. INTL L. &
POL. 723 (1991).
See also Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 1999) (declining to
inquire into the procedures awaiting a relator upon his extradition to the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda); Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999)
("[I]n view of the facts of this case, the well-established rule of non-inquiry, and the
scant authority for creating a humanitarian exception, we decline to overturn either
extradition order on humanitarian grounds."); United States v. Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d
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Soering as providing any plausible support for a constitutional
claim arising from excessive delays on death row.6
Most significantly, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice
Stevens, cited Soering as persuasive authority in two dissents
from denials of certiorari, arguing that a lengthy stay on death
row may well render an execution "inhuman.' 4 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court has been less than receptive to evidence of
international practices when calibrating the Eighth
Amendment by contemporary standards of decency."
103, 110-11 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[Ihe rule of non-inquiry tightly limits the appropriate
scope ofjudicial analysis in an extradition proceeding.... It is not that questions about
what awaits the relator in the requesting country are irrelevant to extradition; it is
that there is another branch of government, which has both final say and greater
discretion in these proceedings, to whom these questions are more properly
addressed."); Martin v. Warden, Atlanta Pen., 993 F.2d 824, 830 n.10 (10th Cir. 1993)
('[J]udicial intervention in extradition proceedings based on humanitarian conditions
is inappropriate.... [HIumanitarian considerations are matters properly reviewed by
the Department of State."); In re Extradition of Manzi, 888 F.2d 204, 206 (1st Cir.
1989) (citing numerous cases that follow the rule of non-inquiry).
63 See Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998) ("We believe
that delay in capital cases is too long. But delay, in large part, is a function of the
desire of our courts, state and federal, to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at least
sufficiently, any argument that might save someone's life .... If it is not cruel and
unusual punishment to execute someone after the electric chair malfunctioned the first
time, . . . we do not see how the present situation even begins to approach a
constitutional violation."); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995) ("With
all due respect to our colleagues abroad, we do not believe this view will prevail in the
United States."). In dissent, Judge Norris cited Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General of
Jamaica, Catholic Comm'n for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe v. Attorney General, and
Soering to support his view that an Eighth Amendment claim of excessive delay on
death row was "substantial, important, and deserving of careful and thoughtful
adjudication." Id. at 1487-88 (Norris, J., dissenting). A few additional cases noted
defendants' citations of Pratt & Morgan v. Attorney General of Jamaica, with a
predictably discouraging response. See, e.g., Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924, 933 (4th Cir.
1995) (Luttig, J., concurring) ("With this argument, we have indeed entered the theater
of the absurd, where politics disguised as 'intellectualism' occupies center stage, no
argument is acknowledged to be frivolous, and common sense and judgment play no
role.").
See Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996-97 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting);
Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 944 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See also Lackey,
514 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (citing Pratt, 2 A.C. at
32-33, 4 All. E.R. at 785-86). The Florida Supreme Court recently vacated a conviction
where the trial court waited twelve years before holding an evidentiary hearing on a
death row convict's state habeas claim. See Jones v. State, 740 So. 2d 520, 524-25 (Fla.
1999) (citing Elledge (Breyer, J., dissenting)). See also Developments in the Law-
International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 2049 (2001).
See Knight, 528 U.S. at 996 ("[We are interpreting a 'Constitution for the
United States of America.'") (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). See also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1
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Reflecting that hostility, Justice Thomas viewed Justice
Breyer's openness to international precedent as a sign of
weakness: "Indeed, were there any such support in our own
jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the
claim to rely on the European Court of Human Rights, the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or
the Privy Council."66
Nor has Soering had much practical effect on the
exercise of the death penalty in the United States. Since the
case was decided, more than 600 people have been lethally
injected, electrocuted, gassed, hanged, and shot by firing
squad.67 Ninety-eight people were executed in 1999, the most in
nearly fifty years and about five times more than were
executed in 1989.68 Many of them spent more than ten years on
death row prior to execution.69 Support for capital punishment
has generally exceeded seventy percent in public opinion polls
for the last two decades and is virtually a prerequisite for
many offices, from state judgeships to the presidency.71
(1989) ("We emphasize that it is American conceptions of decency that are dispositive,
rejecting the contention of petitioners and their various amici ... that the sentencing
practices of other countries are relevant.... [Tihey cannot serve to establish the first
Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that the practice is accepted among our people.")
(citations omitted).
66 Knight, 528 U.S. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States
Department of Justice, are available at http'//www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pubalp2.htm-
#CapitalPunishment (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
68 See id. See also Death Penalty Information Center statistics, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicexec.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2002). Eighty-five
people were executed in 2000 and sixty-six in 2001.
69 See Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 1998,
NCJ 179012, at 1 (Dec. 1999), available at, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/-
pdf/cp98.pdf. (computing that inmates executed in 1998 waited on death row an
average often years and ten months).
70 See Samuel R. Gross, Update: American Public Opinion on the Death
Penalty-It's Getting Personal, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448, 1453 (1998) ("We seem to
have reached a new status quo in which the death penalty is an accepted part of our
criminal justice system; it is widely available, widely supported, and less controversial
than in decades past.... Perhaps in twenty or forty years many Americans will once
again have no clear position on capital punishment, for or against. For now, it remains
a powerful issue over which there is little conflict because the sides are so severely
mismatched."); Hugo Adam Bedau, Interpreting the Eighth Amendment: Principled vs.
Populist Strategies, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 789, 799 (1996); Phoebe C. Ellsworth &
Samuel R. Gross, Hardening of the Attitudes: Americans' Views on the Death Penalty,
50 J. SOC. ISSUES 19 (1994); Kristi Tumminello Prinzo, The United States-Capital" of
the World: An Analysis of Why the United States Practices Capital Punishment While
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Although public support for the death penalty has recently
declined somewhat after revelations about the actual innocence
of dozens of people wrongly sent to death row, this adjustment
in public opinion has had little to do with pressure from
proponents of international human rights norms.7 Congress
has expanded the federal death penalty,72 and in the past
decade, more crimes have become punishable by death in more
states.73 Politicians have responded to foreign criticism of the
the International Trend Is Towards Its Abolition, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 855 (1999);
Christopher J. Meade, Note, Reading Death Sentences: The Narrative Construction of
Capital Punishment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 732, 732-33 (1996). But see Earl Martin,
Towards an Evolving Debate on the Decency of Capital Punishment, 66 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 84, 85 (1997) ("Although popular support for capital punishment has increased
over time, public consideration of the issue has declined greatly from the 1970s to the
present day."); William J. Bowers et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on Capital
Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 77 (1994)
(arguing that support for the death penalty is a "self-perpetuating political myth" and
that while Americans accept the death penalty as an abstract symbol of just
punishment, they often prefer alternatives in specific cases).
None of the major presidential candidates in the 2000 campaign opposed
capital punishment. Gross, supra, at 1452 ("Since Michael Dukakis's debacle in 1988,
no serious candidate for president has expressed any opposition to capital
punishment."); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75
B.U. L. REV. 759 (1995); Henry Weinstein, Pope Asks Bush to Stay Murderer's
Execution Appeal, L.A. TIiES, Jan. 21, 2000, at A24, available at 2000 WL 2203080.
When President George W. Bush was governor of Texas, more than 152 people were
executed-nearly twenty percent of the 765 executions performed since the resumption
of capital punishment in 1976. See id.; Death Penalty Information Center, Number of
Executions by State Since 1976, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgdpicreg.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2002); Death Penalty Information Center, Upcoming Executions,
http'//www.deathpenaltyinfo.orgexecutionalert.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2002). Bush
was elected governor in 1994 after a campaign that questioned incumbent Ann
Richards's support for the death penalty. Forty-five people were executed during
Richards's term of office. See Bright & Keenan, supra.71 See Steven A. Holmes, Look Who's Questioning the Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, § 4, at 3; Editorial, Bills to Stop Executing the Innocent, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2000, at A22; Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars
Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2000, at Al. The Canadian Supreme Court's recent
decision requiring assurances in extraditions to the United States that the death
penalty would not be sought showed a heightened concern with the issue of actual
innocence. See United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283, 1, 38, 95, 108-10 (Can.).72 See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts
About the Department of Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAMi URB. L.J. 347, 386-88 (1999).
According to Bacre Waly Ndiaye, United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, "[oinly China has expanded the
death penalty laws at the same rate." Ann Cooper, Human Rights Investigator Finds
U.S. Is Touchy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 1997, at A19, available at 1997 WL-WSJ
14169630. Thirty-eight states now impose the death penalty. See Gross, supra note 70,
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death penalty with defiance and contempt,74 invoking Soering
to justify the curtailment of death penalty appeals. Because
lengthy stays on death row are often the result of direct
appeals and collateral attacks, streamlining such avenues of
relief becomes arguably more humane.75 In 1996, Congress
imposed a one-year filing deadline for federal habeas claims
and established strict timetables for judicial review. 76 One of
the bill's sponsors, Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, had
for years cited Soering in floor debates to support curbing
habeas corpus."
at 1453. Kansas and New York enacted death penalty legislation in 1994 and 1995. See
1995 N.Y. Laws ch. 1; 1994 Kan. Sess. Laws ch. 252 (H.B. 2578); James Dao, Death
Penalty in New York Reinstated After 18 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al. See
also Stephanie Salter, Voters to Judges: Discretion Is Not an Option, S.F. EXAMINER,
Mar. 31, 1996, at A21, available at 1996 WL 3707061 (describing three voter
initiatives, all of which passed with more than eighty percent of the popular vote, that
added carjacking, drive-by shootings, and the murders of jurors to the list of "special
circumstances" mandating sentences of death or life without parole).
7 When United Nations Special Rapporteur Ndiaye spent eighteen days in
1997 investigating the death penalty in the United States, neither President Clinton,
Vice President Gore, nor Secretary of State Albright would meet with him. Senator
Jesse Helms called the visit "an intentional insult to the U.S.," and United States
Ambassador to the U.N. Bill Richardson said that Ndiaye's report "will collect a lot of
dust." Cooper, supra note 73. In a recent debate, former Georgia Attorney General
Michael Bowers said, "Are we going to listen to people from places like France to
decide how we are going to run our court system here? Are we going to listen to people
from Sweden tell us what to do? Canada? Mexico? These people don't understand our
customs. They don't understand our practices.'" Warren Allmand et al., Human Rights
and Human Wrongs: Is the United States Death Penalty System Inconsistent with
International Human Rights Law?, 67 FOlDHAM L. REV. 2793, 2799 (1999) (quoted by
Stephen B. Bright during a panel discussion).
7" See John Quigley & S. Adele Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human
Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241, 268-69 (1989) ("One
solution, of course, would be to eliminate the collateral attack procedures that consume
most of the post-trial time in the typical capital case."); Gregory B. Richardson et al.,
Major Contemporary Issues in Extradition Law, 84 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 389, 405
(1990) (remarks of Yoram Dinstein) ("The incongruous moral of the story is. that the
United States would not run afoul of human rights if it were to execute without delay
all prisoners convicted of capital crimes.") Susan M. McGarvey, Note, Missed
Opportunity?: The Affirmation of the Death Penalty in the AEDPA Extradition
Scenarios, 24 J. LEGIS. 99, 104 (1998) ("The proponents of the AEDPA presumably
would assert that habeas corpus reforms lessen any possible death row phenomenon.").
76 See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253-55 and adding 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2261-66).
See 141 CONG. REC. S7,803, 7,804 (June 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Specter)
("[W]e have a situation where these long delays involve continuing travail and pain to
the family of the victims awaiting closure .... We also have an adjudication under the
European Convention on Human Rights that concluded that the practice in the State
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Soering has not had a chilling effect on the extradition
process; the United States makes and receives more
extradition requests than ever before.78 When faced with a
Soering-type situation, American prosecutors simply make
assurances that they will not seek the death penalty.79 As a
result, Jens Soering is serving two life sentences in Virginia.
Likewise, Charles Short, whom the Netherlands initially
refused to extradite, faced a court martial and is imprisoned in
of Virginia where cases were delayed for 6 to 8 years constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment .... It seems to me the Congress of the United States ... ought to act to
make the death penalty an effective deterrent."); 137 CONG. REC. S8,649, S8,662 (June
26, 1991) (statement of Sen. Specter) ("The death penalty and the whole judicial
system are really the laughingstock of the criminal element in this country because,
succinctly stated, the death penalty is not carried out in any rational way ....
[L]engthy delays are, in effect, a way to defeat the imposition of the death penalty. But
I suggest that does not make any sense in terms of a rational criminal justice system.
The European Court on Human Rights recently concluded that such delay raised an
issue of cruel and unusual punishment. In the Soering case, that court found cruel and
unusual punishment when somebody was on death row for many years, as in the U.S.
system, contrasted with no finding of cruel and unusual punishment for the actual
imposition of the death penalty."). Specter has also argued that Soering is generally
irrelevant for prosecutors. See Arlen Specter, The Time Has Come for a Terrorist Death
Penalty Law, 95 DICK. L. REV. 739, 754 (1991) ("When a country refuses to extradite a
criminal unless the United States agrees not to seek the death penalty, the United
States has no choice but to agree to such terms. To use the extradition problem as an
argument against the death penalty, however, merely obscures the issue. The addition
of the death penalty option does not require United States law enforcement officials to
seek the death penalty, it merely affords them the option of invoking the death
penalty.").
The reaction of Caribbean nations to Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General of
Jamaica, a Soering-influenced Privy Council decision upholding excessive delay claims,
similarly shows the perverse effects of recognizing the validity of "death row
phenomenon" defenses. Trinidad and Jamaica withdrew from the American
Convention of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, on the grounds that appeals to the Interamerican Court of Human Rights and
the United Nations Human Rights Committee would cause inhumane delay for death
row inmates. See Natalia Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws the Right of International
Petition Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L
L. 563 (1998); Trinidad Executes 9 Persons and Other Caribbean Governments Follow
Its Lead, 15 INT'L ENF. L. REP. (July 1999); Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., Court's Promise
Now in Peril, CHi. DAILY L. BULL., July 13, 1999, at 6; Larry Rohter, In the Caribbean,
Support Growing for the Death Penalty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1998, at A14.
78 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
79 A shrinking minority of state prosecutors refuse to make such assurances.
See, e.g., Edward Hegstrom, DA Stands Pat on Foreigners, Death Penalty, HOUS.
CHRON., Jan. 12, 2001, at 21, available at 2001 WL 299229; Ted Rohrlich, DA to Stop
Seeking Death in Some Cases to Ease Extraditions Justice, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2001, at
B3, available at 2001 WL 2450544.
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the United States." Because only a trivial number of
extraditions involve capital offenses, prosecutors seldom have
to make Soering-type assurances, and neither international
criminal enforcement nor capital punishment is ever much
affected. Death penalty exceptions to extradition have emerged
less as a repudiation of the rule of non-inquiry than as an
easily decided formal issue-similar to dual criminality-that
is routinely incorporated into treaties. s Soering merely adds a
low procedural hurdle in a small subset of cases. Given the
level of critical interest devoted to the case, its impact on
American practices and policies has been eerily slight.
III. REFOCUSING THE DISCUSSION OF SOERING: ATTACKING
PRISON CONDITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Scholars have primarily examined Soering in the
context of debates over the desirability of the rule of non-
inquiry and the legality of the death penalty and the death row
phenomenon.82 This compartmentalization is understandable;
Soering contributed a dramatic narrative and a bold legal
opinion to two fertile academic fields. Nevertheless, such
scholarship has suffered from a certain myopia. Because
Soering was widely assumed to catalyze change, the
commentary did not examine the mechanics of how such
change would occur. The rare instances in which commentators
w See Highet et al., supra note 55, at 702 ("As this case ultimately turned out,
the U.S. official exercising prosecutorial discretion elected not to charge Staff Sergeant
Short with capital murder. After that decision was conveyed to the Dutch Government,
it transferred him to U.S. custody.").
81 See Dugard & Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 6, at 206 ("The death penalty
exception is . . . a form of conditional extradition: states that have adopted this
exception in their extradition treaties or statutes will normally secure satisfactory
assurances from the requesting state, as an explicit precondition to extradition, that
the individual will not be executed. . . . Conditions of the above kind are not
controversial, as they do not reflect upon the quality of criminal justice in the
requesting state.").
82 See, e.g., Quigley & Shank, supra note 75, at 256-67 (applying Soering's
implications for the extraterritorial reach of human rights obligations solely to the
death row situation); Mary K Martin, Note, A One-Way Ticket Back to the United
States: The Collision of International Extradition Law and the Death Penalty, 11 CAP.
DEF. J. 243 (1999) (exploring "the question whether the United States will be able to
continue to seek successfully extradition of foreign-nationals from abolitionist
countries without agreeing in advance to eschew the death penalty").
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questioned the extent of Soering's impact occurred within
narrow discussions of death row jurisprudence and never
considered that Soering might affect other contexts.'
In fact, as a precedent for extradition challenges based
on inhuman or degrading prison conditions in the United
States, Soering has broad potential to confront problems of
achieving "normative consistency" and expanding the judicial
role in an area of the law traditionally guided by foreign policy
considerations. Although Soering's implications for cases about
prison conditions have been noted in summary fashion,' they
have never been explored in any depth or with an eye towards
the larger question of whether the European Court of Human
Rights can-or even wants to-confront the United States on a
significant domestic policy issue. If the European Court
blocked an extradition to the United States because prison
conditions there violated the European Convention, the United
States could not shrug off such challenges by m'aking
assurances about the treatment relators would receive upon
extradition. Compared to extraditions involving capital cases, a
much larger number of defendants would be entitled to
assurances. These assurances would be far more intrusive into
the daily operations and physical upkeep of prison facilities
and would force the United States to admit, in essence, that it
has violated the rights of thousands of prisoners.85 The sections
that follow will survey European human rights law regarding
conditions of confinement, the elements of a successful
extradition defense, and how the European Court might
evaluate certain widely reported abuses in American prisons.
See, e.g., Florencio J. Yuzon, Conditions and Circumstances of Living on
Death Row-Violative of Individual Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?: Divergent
Trends of Judicial Review in Evaluating the "Death Row Phenomenon," 30 GEO. WASH.
J. INT'L L. & ECON. 39 (1996) (comparing European and American cases on death row
conditions); Renee E. Boxman, Comment, The Road to Soering and Beyond: Will the
United States Recognize the "Death Row Phenomenon?," 14 HOUS. J. INTL L. 151
(1991).
See Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 53.
See Dugard & Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 6, at 201 ("[Alssurances of
acceptable prison conditions are unlikely to be forthcoming from requesting states, as
most states reject suggestions that their prisons fail to meet international minimum
standards."). See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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A. European Case Law on Prison Conditions
Soering observed that in the extradition context, the
notion of "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment"
may require balancing "the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights" with "the interest of all nations that
suspected offenders who flee abroad should be brought to
justice."86 At the same time, however, the right of individuals to
be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment has
long trumped national and international security interests in
European Convention case law. 7 Although Soering marked the
first time that the European Court heard an extradition
defense premised on the potential for Article 3 violations in the
requesting country, nearly thirty years of European
Commission of Human Rights8 case law on the subject had
held that "the sole factor to be considered is the existence of an
objective danger to the person extradited.8 9 The Soering Court
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35. In cases involving torture, as
opposed to inhuman or degrading treatment, presumably no balancing of defendants'
rights against the interests of international criminal justice would ever be permissible.
Id. See also GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS 173 (1998).
87 See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1978)
("The Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment and punishment, irrespective of the victim's conduct.... [Tihere can be no
derogation therefrom even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of
the nation.").
8The European Convention established both the Court and the Commission.
See European Convention, supra note 4, at art. 19. The Commission may receive
petitions from any person, non-governmental organization or group of individuals
claiming to be victims of a Convention violation. Id. at art. 25. A case can only be
referred to the Court by the Commission or a High Contracting Party and only after
"the Commission has acknowledged the failure of efforts for a friendly settlement...."
Id. at art. 47, 48. See Michael O'Boyle, Extradition and Expulsion Under the European
Convention on Human Rights: Reflections on the Soering Case, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF BRIAN WALSH 93, 95 (James O'Reilly ed.,
1992) ("That the Court had to wait until the Soering case to be seised of the Article 3
issue can be explained by the fact that many of these cases [before the Commission]
were rejected as inadmissible on grounds of non-substantiation or, in meritorious
cases, were settled quietly and privately prior to the determination of admissibility.").
89 B. v. France, App. No. 11722/85, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 165, 177
(1987). See also K. and F. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12543/86, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 272, 276 (1986) ("[A] person's extradition may, exceptionally, give rise to
issues under Article 3 of the Convention where extradition is contemplated to a
country in which 'due to the very nature of the regime of that country or to a particular
situation in that country, basic human rights, such as are guaranteed by the
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prefaced its brief discussion of balancing individual and state
interests by noting that Article 3 is an "absolute prohibition"
on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment." In concluding that the "death row phenomenon7
violated Article 3, the European Court did not in fact conduct a
balancing test. Rather, the Court reached its holding because
"the applicant's extradition to the United States would expose
him to a real risk of treatment going beyond the threshold set
by Article 3."9 This inquiry-whether an individual faces (1) a
real risk of (2) treatment or punishment that violates Article
3-has exclusively engaged the European Court in subsequent
cases.92 Although the dicta in Soering preserve the possibility
that the European Court will consider security interests when
Convention, might be either grossly violated or entirely suppressed.' ") (citations
omitted); Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 10308/83, 36 Eur. Comm'n
H.R. Dec. & Rep. 209, 232 (1984) ("[O]nly the existence of an objective danger to the
person to be extradited may be considered."); X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, App.
No. 6315/73, 1 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 73, 75 (1974) (IT]he expulsion or
extradition of an individual could, in certain exceptional cases, prove to be in breach of
... Article 3, whilst there are serious reasons to believe that he could be subjected to
such treatment prohibited by the said Article 3 in the State to which he must be
sent."). See also O'Boyle, supra note 88, at 94-95 (describing Commission caselaw
dating back to the 1960s); Van Den Wyngaert, supra note 53, at 765-67 ("In Western
Europe [the application of Article 3 to extradition] is clear from the consistent case law
of the European Commission on Human Rights since the early 1960s, and is now also
explicitly included in various international instruments and in many modern
extradition treaties in the form of the discrimination clause.").
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34 ("Article 3 makes no provision for
exceptions and no derogation from it is permissible... in time of war or other national
emergency. This absolute prohibition on torture and of inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment under the terms of the Convention shows that Article 3
enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic societies making up the
Council of Europe."). The "inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in
which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. . . ." Id.
" Id. at 44-45.
See, e.g., Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831, 23
Eur. H.R. Rep. 413 (1996), at 91 81 (-It should not be inferred from the [Soering] Court's
remarks concerning the risk of undermining the foundations of extradition.., that
there is any room for balancing the risk of ill-treatment against the reasons for
expulsion in determining whether a State's responsibility under Article 3 is engaged.");
H.L.R. v. France, 1997-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 745, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29 (1997) at 11 34-35,
39; Ahimed v. Austria, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R., Rep. Judgments & Dec. 2195, 24 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 278 (1997), at 41 ("[Ihe activities of the individual in question, however
undesirable or dangerous, cannot be a material consideration.").
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faced with cases that truly threaten the extradition system,93
the prohibition against torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment remains absolute.94 The following sections discuss
how European human rights bodies have defined "real risk"
and torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment and whether a fugitive from the United States
could ever raise a colorable claim under these standards.
1. Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
a. Methodological Preliminaries
In giving meaning to Article 3, the European Court and
Commission have conceived of torture, inhuman treatment or
punishment, and degrading treatment or punishment as three
separate classes of violations, "different points along a
continuum, or in a hierarchy, of severity." . This continuum
runs from torture, the most severe, to degrading treatment or
punishment, the least severe. As one might expect from a
system that requires exhaustion of domestic remedies and
offers numerous opportunities for settlement," the Court and
See GILBERT, supra note 86, at 173 ("[The balancing exercise seen in
Soering between protecting the fugitive's human rights and ensuring that criminal
laws are enforced will necessarily provide States with a great deal of discretion in this
field, subject only to the absolute bar on surrender if the fugitive would face torture...
9"See Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep.
553 (1996), at 62 ("Article 3 . . . enshrines one of the fundamental values of
democratic society. Even in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight
against organized terrorism and crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. ... ").
9Rod Morgan & Malcolm D. Evans, CPT Standards: An Overview, in
PROTECTING PRISONERS: THE STANDARDS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR THE
PREVENTION OF TORTURE IN CONTEXT 31, 39 (Morgan & Evans eds., 1999) [hereinafter
PROTECTING PRISONERS]; Gilles Dutertre & Jakob Van der Velde, Article 3ECHR-The
Prohibition of Torture, 41A Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 19, 19-20 (1998).
9See, e.g., B. v. France, App. No. 11722/85, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
165, 173, 177 (1987) (rejecting Moroccan nationals challenge of extradition from
France to Morocco, where he was sentenced to death in absentia, because his case was
subject to subsequent appeal in French courts). See also Wolfgang Peukert, The
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and the European Convention on
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Commission have not completely delimited the standards for
an Article 3 violation. Short-term detainees, as opposed to
prisoners, have brought the bulk of the cases, so much of the
case law focuses on police practices rather than conditions of
confinement.
A clearer picture of European norms emerges by
additional reference to other sources of human rights law,
sources that have influenced and been influenced by the case
law."' Although the revised European version of the Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners is not binding
on member states (and deviation from them has not been the
basis for any action brought under Article 3), it has provided
an undoubtedly influential "yardstick and frame of reference."98
It would be little exaggeration to say that the Court,
Commission, and member states all subscribe to the basic
premise of the Rules: "Imprisonment is by the deprivation of
liberty a punishment in itself. The conditions of imprisonment
and the prison regimes shall not, therefore, except as
incidental to justifiable segregation or the maintenance of
discipline, aggravate the suffering inherent in this.""
International human rights tribunals, such as the United
Nations Human Rights Committee and the Committee Against
Torture, have heard a number of cases involving circumstances
similar to Article 3 claims in Europe, providing another useful
point of reference." Most importantly, since 1989, the
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Human Rights, in PROTECTING PRISONERS, supra note 95, at 85, 100 ("Some of the
alleged victims will obtain reparation on the domestic level but prisoners will often not
have either the courage and perseverance or the financial or intellectual capacity to
complain effectively about their treatment following their arrest.").
9
7 See A. REYNAUD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN PRISONS 52-60 (1986) (merging
discussion of caselaw with that of the Council of Europe's Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners); Peukert, supra note 96, at 101 ("Above all else, the
development of the ECHR case law shows that terms such as 'torture,' 'inhuman,' and
'degrading' cannot be interpreted in a static manner, but have to be understood and
interpreted in light of the existing standards in European public order.").
98 Council of Europe, European Prison Rules (Recommendation No. R (87) 3
adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 12 February 1987
and Explanatory Memorandum), at 79-80 (1987).
9Id., Rule 64, at 19.
10 These two bodies were established by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, and the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, June 26,
1987, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Torture Convention], respectively.
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Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CPT") has
inspected and reported on prisons and detention facilities in
Council of Europe member states."1 Although CPT reports do
not perfectly overlap with Court and Commission decisions in
their use of the terms "torture," "inhuman treatment or
punishment," and "degrading treatment or punishment," 2 the
meticulous attention' 3 that the CPT has devoted to conditions
of confinement in scores of prisons has accelerated the
development of common practices in prison administration
throughout Europe."'
b. Distinguishing Torture from Inhuman
Treatment or Punishment
"The special stigma of torture" attaches to egregious
conduct and egregious effects on victims---!deliberate inhuman
treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering." 5
Designed to elicit admissions or information from the victim,
torture generally requires special "preparation and exertion"
on the part of the torturers.' For example, the Court held that
'" See generally Malcolm D. Evans & Rod Morgan, The CPT An Introduction,
in PROTECTING PRISONERS, supra note 95, at 9-19.
10 Morgan & Evans, supra note 95, at 34-40.
'03 Note, for example, the hefty report devoted to prison conditions in
Denmark, CPT Denmark Report, CPT/Inf (97) 4 [EN] (Apr. 24, 1997), http-//www.cpt.-
coe.int/enlreportsinf1997-04en.htm.
'04 See Jim Murdoch, CPT Standards Within the Context of the Council of
Europe, in PROTECTING PRISONERS, supra note 95, at 103, 106-10 (describing the CPT
as a quasi-legislative body that is pushing member states beyond the "internal
reflection" promoted by the rules towards specific external standards). Although CPT
reports are not binding on the human rights tribunals, they have been cited in cases as
authority. See Peukert, supra note 96, at 91-92 (describing Aerts v. Belgium, 1998-V
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1939, a 1998 case in which an inmate in a prison psychiatric wing
successfully made an Article 3 claim to the European Commission based on a CPT
report of substandard medical care but was reversed by the European Court).
'5 Aksoy, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 63 (quoting Ireland v. United Kingdom,
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67).
" See id. at 64. Similarly, the CPT "considers torture to be the premeditated
(as opposed to casual or heat-of-the-moment), purposive infliction of severe pain,
generally involving the use of specialized techniques or instruments, with a view to
extracting information or confessions or the attainment of other specific ends." Morgan
& Evans, supra note 95, at 36 (citing the CPT's first Bulgaria Report, which
documented the police practices of beating the soles of the feet). This standard is
narrower than the Torture Convention's definition:
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Turkish authorities tortured a Kurdish activist when they tied
his arms behind his back and suspended him from the ceiling
by his arms, resulting in paralysis of the arms. 7 By contrast,
British authorities merely engaged in "inhuman and
degrading" conduct when they forced IRA prisoners to stand for
hours spread-eagle against a wall with their weight on their
fingers, hooded them, subjected them to loud and hissing
noises, and deprived them of sleep, food, and drink.' Neither
the penal "techniques" alleged in Ireland v. United Kingdom
nor the suffering inflicted crossed the torture threshold.
While Ireland nonetheless involved punishment of a
fairly high level of severity, inhuman and degrading treatment
encompasses a broad range of conduct and injury. Nearly every
[Amny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him ... or intimidiating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain
or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity.
Torture Cony., supra note 100, at art. 1.
107Aksoy, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14, 64. This practice is known as
"Palestinian hanging." Turkish authorities also stripped the prisoner naked,
blindfolded him, and administered electric shocks to his genitals while he was hanging.
See also Yagiz v. Turkey, App. No. 19092/91, 75 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 207
(1993) (admitting claim of torture where police inflicted crippling injuries with a
truncheon on a suspect's feet and sexually assaulted her); Sargin and Yagci v. Turkey,
App. Nos. 14116/88 & 14117/88, 61 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 250, 272, 283-84
(1989) (admitting the application of political prisoners who through nineteen days of
detention were questioned continuously by teams of interrogators while either
blindfolded or with bright lights in their eyes, given tea laced with narcotics and
injections, subjected to high pressure jets of cold water to their heads and testicles,
suspended with arms tied behind backs from the ceiling, administered electric shocks,
and threatened with being thrown out of a window). For discussion of additional cases
of torture in Turkey, see Peukert, supra note 96, at 95-97. The adjudications of other
international bodies enforcing treaties prohibiting torture provide additional factual
situations. Cf Tala v. Sweden, Committee Against Torture, Comm. No. 43/1996, U.N.
Doc. CAT/C/17/D/43/1996 (1996), at 2.3 (Iranian opposition activist beaten and
kicked and subjected to interrogations that involved, among other tortures, being
forced to lie down on his stomach and having a hot metal object pressed against his
thighs until he passed out); Mutombo v. Switzerland, Committee Against Torture,
Comm. No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc. A/49/44 at 45, 2.2 (1994) (Zairian political activist
subjected to electric shocks, beaten with a rifle, and his testicles were bruised until he
lost consciousness); Khan v. Canada, Committee Against Torture, Comm. No. 15/1994,
U.N. Doc. AI50/44 at 46, 3.3 (1995) (Pakistani activist given cuts on his back, with
chemicals being applied to the cuts to intensify the pain).
'
08 Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41, 66.
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decision on the issue by the Court and Commission includes
boilerplate language to the effect that such claims must meet a
"minimum level of severity,""9 but that minimum "depends on
all circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the
treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the
sex, age and state of health of the victim.""0 Claims of
"inhuman" treatment or punishment need not involve severe
injury, as long as the petitioner can prove that he or she
suffered unnecessary pain while in custody. The standard for
inhuman treatment or punishment seems linked to practices
that lack a rational or proportional relationship to the basic
security and disciplinary purposes of detention: "[In respect of
a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force
which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct
diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement
of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention.""' This rule
arises in part from the recognition that severe pain may be
inflicted without leaving physical marks. Thus, slight bruising
met the minimum level of severity where medical examinations
noted its consistency with a Corsican detainee's allegations
that French police working in shifts beat him continuously for
forty hours." Likewise, because of its severe psychological
effects, "total social and sensory isolation" constitutes inhuman
109 Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59 (1993)
("Article 3, by expressly prohibiting 'inhuman' and 'degrading' punishment, implies
that there is a distinction between such punishment and punishment more
generally."). See also Vilvarajah and Others v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) (1991) ("Ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within
the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum, is, in the nature of things,
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case."); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15 (1978).
11 Vilvarajah, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 162.
Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1995).
12 See Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992). See also Ribitsch,
336 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26. Ribitsch ruled in favor of a suspected heroin dealer
who claimed that he was taken into custody, "grossly insulted," threatened, punched
and kicked, pulled to the ground by his hair, and had his head rammed into the floor.
Aside from bruising, the injuries were mainly psychological and psychosomatic. Id. at
12. In another case, the Commission made a finding of inhuman treatment where
Swiss authorities did not allow a suspected Colombian drug cartel trafficker to change
out of his dirty and torn clothes for twenty-four hours and neglected to treat his broken
rib for a week. The case was settled prior to a European Court ruling. See Hurtado v.
Switzerland, 280 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), annex at 10, 13-16 (commission report).
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treatment,1 13  as does the threat of torture or impending
death." Additionally, a 1997 ruling that prohibited the United
Kingdom from deporting a man who was dying of AIDS to a
country with few health care resources suggests that
extraditing an ill person to a country with inadequate prison
hospitals may amount to inhuman treatment." 5 Similarly, the
CPT has designated as "inhuman" environmental deprivations
such as overcrowding, lack of proper sanitation, confinement to
cells, lack of outdoor exercise, and isolation from the outside
world."16
1 See R. v. Denmark, App. No. 10263/83, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
149, 153 (1985) ("Complete sensory isolation coupled with complete social isolation can
no doubt ultimately destroy the personality, and may therefore, in certain
circumstances, constitute a form of inhuman treatment which cannot be justified by
the requirements of security, the prohibition of torture and inhuman treatment...
being absolute."); Xv. United Kingdom, App. No. 8158/78, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 95 (1980) (same). In each of these cases, the Commission found that prolonged
solitary confinement did not violate Article 3 because it was justified by security,
disciplinary or protective reasons and was a far cry from complete sensory or social
isolation.
114 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 44; Case of Campbell and Cosans,
48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1982) ("[Plrovided it is sufficiently real and immediate,
a mere threat of conduct prohibited by Article 3 may itself be in conflict with the
provision. Thus, to threaten an individual with torture might in some circumstances
constitute at least 'inhuman treatment'." [sic]).
.. See D. v. United Kingdom, 1997-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 777, 791, 24 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 423 (1997) (cited in Dutertre & Van der Velde, supra note 95, at 24-27).
"
6 See CPT, Report to the Government of Greece on the Visit to Greece Carried
Out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 14 to 26 March 1993, CPT/Inf (94) 20
[EN], at 1 76 (Nov. 29, 1994), at http'//www.cpt.coe.intlen/reportsfmf9420en.htm
(describing as "inhuman" a detention center that held forty-six inmates despite its
capacity of forty and provided "old and dirty" mattresses, unhygienic toilet facilities,
limited outdoor exercise, and poor lighting and ventilation); CPT, 2nd General Report
on the CPI's Activities Covering the Period 1 January to 31 December 1991, CPT/Inf
(92) 3 [EN], at I 46-58 (Apr. 13, 1992), at http://www.cpt.coe.intlen/general/rep-
2.htm#IIl.b. ("[Tihe level of overcrowding in a prison, or in a particular part of it, might
be such as to be in itself inhuman or degrading from a physical standpoint ...
[P]risoners cannot simply be left to languish for weeks, possibly months, locked up in
their cells, and this regardless of how good material conditions might be within the
cells .... It is also very important for prisoners to maintain reasonably good contact
with the outside world."); Morgan & Evans, supra note 95, at 38 ("[The combination of
overcrowding, lack of integral sanitation, almost unalleviated cellular confinement,
and/or lack of outdoor exercise have on several occasions been judged [by the CPT to
amount to inhuman and degrading treatment."); Council of Europe, supra note 98,




The Court and Commission have rejected claims where
the alleged suffering arguably occurred incident to legitimate
arrest procedures"7 or reasonable penal practice. 118 Likewise,
cases have turned on the claimant's failure to prove that
authorities actually inflicted the alleged injuries."9 In one case,
however, where it was impossible to tell whether the claimant
was beaten by Bulgarian police or by his father, the Court
found an Article 3 violation because authorities failed to
investigate the claim thoroughly. 20
117 See, e.g., Klaas v. Germany, 269 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17, 18 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 305 (1993) (dismissing claim that police manhandled a woman being taken into
custody for a blood alcohol test where the injuries were equally consistent with a police
account that she resisted arrest and where national courts found against the claimant).
In Hurtado, described supra, note 112, the Commission dismissed a claim alleging an
Article 3 violation where Swiss police put a hood over a suspected drug trafficker's
head while arresting him. See also XM v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8158/78, 21 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 95, 98 (1980) (finding no violation for injuries sustained
during arrest where 150 witnesses said that the use of force was reasonable to prevent
his escape and where only bruising resulted).
"" See Treholt v. Norway, App. No. 14610/89, 71 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 168, 190 (1991). For example, the Commission held that a former civil servant
serving twenty years in prison for espionage did not make an Article 3 claim of
sufficient severity regarding his conditions of confinement. While detained before trial,
Treholt was put under constant surveillance and held in a prison cell with little fresh
air-but he was given a bicycle and treadmill for exercise and had three rooms for
sleep, visitors, and storage. Later, he was placed in a ward with violent offenders, but
such treatment was consistent with the practice of grouping prisoners by length of
sentence. In addition, Treholt was allowed nearly daily visits and was permitted to
attend French classes. See also Wakefield v. United Kingdom, App. No. 15817/89, 66
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 251 (1990) (holding no Article 3 violation for the refusal
to transfer prisoner convicted of murder and manslaughter from England to Scotland
to be near his family); R. v. Denmark, App. No. 10263/83, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 149 (1985) (finding no Article 3 violation for preventively detaining man accused
of drug and murder charges in solitary confinement for seventeen months before trial,
where he was allowed limited visits and one hour of fresh air per day, and had a radio,
television, and prison library privileges); X v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. at 95 (finding no violation for placing IRA member in solitary confinement
for more than two years where he had helped other prisoners build explosives, had
access to books from the library, regular exercise, access to writing materials, and was
allowed to go to chapel); Guzzardi Case, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 40-41 (1980)
(holding that it was not a violation to sentence convict to three years of "special
supervision" on a Mediterranean island with limited employment opportunities rather
than near his family in Northern Italy).
" See, e.g., Diaz Ruano v. Spain, 285-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), 19 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 542 (1994), annex at 47 (commission report) (finding no violation where marks on
the body of a Canary Islander killed in a gunfight with police during interrogation
were arguably not caused by police).
120 See Assenov v. Bulgaria, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R., Rep. Judgments & Dec. at
106 (1998).
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c. Degrading Treatment or Punishment
The victim of degrading treatment or punishment need
not "suffer any severe or long-lasting effects." 21 A cognizable
claim depends only on whether the victim suffers "humiliation
or debasement" of some minimum degree in his own eyes or in
the eyes of others." Much of the case law concerns the corporal
punishment of British school children. Sometimes the nature
and circumstances of the punishment seem inherently
degrading. For example, a judicial sentence of three strokes of
a birch cane given by police to a teenage boy's "bare posterior"
was degrading,' as was a single lash to the hand of a sixteen-
year-old girl, when administered and witnessed by male school
officials.m4 Otherwise, without medical certificates or other
evidence of adverse psychological effects, a claim will fail."=
Government or police measures that seem rationally related to
121 Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) at 16-17. Compare Raninen v. Finland, 1998
Eur. Ct. H.R., 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 563 (1998), at 55 ("[I]n considering whether a
punishment or treatment is "degrading" within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will
have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and
whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her
personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3.").
'2 Campbell and Cosans, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1982). See also
Raninen, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 55 ("[T]he public nature of the punishment or
treatment may be a relevant factor. At the same time, it should be recalled, the
absence of publicity will not necessarily prevent a given treatment from falling into
that category, it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes,
even if not in the eyes of others."). See also Morgan & Evans, supra note 95, at 39
(describing how the CPT labeled as "degrading" the practice of Swiss police to watch
suspected drug mules defecate in a special toilet called "the throne").
123 See Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16 ("[H]is punishment-whereby he
was treated as an object in the power of the authorities-constituted an assault on
precisely that which it is one of the main purposes of Article three to protect, namely a
person's dignity and physical integrity. Neither can it be excluded that the punishment
may have had adverse psychological effects."). Compare Costello-Roberts, 247-C Eur.
Ct. H.R. at 52 (holding that three "whacks' on the bottom through [a seven-year-old
boarding school studenfs] shorts with a rubber-soled gym shoe" lacked the minimum
level of severity for a claim of degrading treatment).
124 See Warwick v. United Kingdom, App. No. 9471/81, Eur. Comm'n H.R.,
Report of July 18, 1986 (unreported).
'2 See Campbell and Cosans, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (holding that two
Scottish students who had not been subject to corporal punishment but merely feared




a regulatory goal and are "not designed to, and did not,




Before blocking an extradition, the European Court and
Commission must determine not only whether the requesting
country is actually violating Article 3, but also whether the
individual claimant actually risks being victimized. 27 In
practice, proof of risk closely tracks proof of the substantive
Article 3 violation. The less convincing the evidence is that an
alleged practice violates Article 3, the harder European
tribunals police the risk requirement. 128 For example, the
126 Case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 40, 42 (1985) (denying claim by legal United Kingdom residents whose
husbands were denied entry because of laws purporting to control immigration and
protect the domestic labor market). See also Raninen, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 58
(holding that the public handcuffing of a conscientious objector arrested and escorted
to a military hospital was not degrading where the arresting officer acted within orders
that showed no purpose to humiliate, even though the arrest was illegal); L6pez Ostra
v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (denying claim by neighbors of a foul
smelling tannery waste treatment plain built with a state subsidy twelve meters from
their homes); Case of Albert and LeCompte, 58 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13 (1983)
(denying claims by two doctors that being suspended from practice by disciplinary
authorities was degrading); Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979) (denying
challenge to a Belgian law that does not automatically give biological parents rights
over their illegitimate children).
127 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35-36. See also GILBERT, supra
note 86, at 158-59, 164-65. Cf Torture Convention, supra note 100, at art. 3 § 1 ("No
State Party shall expel, return.. . or extradite a person to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to
torture."). Note that unlike the European case law, the Torture Convention does not
prohibit extradition in situations involving inhuman or degrading treatment.
128 See also Djeroud v. France, 191 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1991)
(reporting a friendly settlement after the Commission found no real risk of ill
treatment for an Algerian deportee where he had provided only vague proof of two
alleged occasions of prior ill treatment by Algerian authorities); Y.H. v. Federal
Republic of Germany, App. No. 12461/86, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 258, 264
(1986) ("[The application is... manifestly ill-founded... [because] the applicant has
provided no evidence for her allegation that, while being a Lebanese citizen, she would
be persecuted as the spouse of a Palestinian currently residing in Berlin, throughout
the entire Lebanon, or in a Palestinian camp established in the country in which she
would have to reside."); Lynas v. Switzerland, App. No. 7317/75, 6 Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 141, 165 (1976) (denying challenge by American in Swiss custody facing
extradition to the United States on cocaine charges where he did not adequately prove
that by extraditing him to the United States, Swiss authorities did in fact expose him
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Soering case involved someone who had a reasonable chance of
avoiding the death penalty. The United Kingdom argued that
Jens Soering might win a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity, and if convicted, his age, mental state, and lack of a
criminal record might lower the sentence.9 Yet those
mitigating circumstances factored little in the calculus of "real
risk" once the Court accepted that the lengthy average stay on
Virginia's harsh death row was in fact an Article 3 violation.
In a subsequent case, however, the Commission denied
an extradition challenge by three people indicted in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana on
charges of large-scale marijuana distribution and continuing
criminal enterprise. The claimants faced life sentences without
the possibility of parole, sentences that they alleged
constituted inhuman punishment. The Commission ruled that
"it is not established that the first applicant, if extradited,
would actually risk imprisonment for life without any hope of
release. Even if convicted, he might get a lesser sentence, and,
even if he should receive a life sentence, he might be released
before having completed his sentence."3 ' A substantive
judgment on whether a sentence of life in prison in itself
violated Article 3 seemed built into the "real risk" analysis:
"The possibility under the law of the United States . . . of
release of persons found to be physically or mentally unable to
serve a penalty shows concern to prevent treatment
incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention."' 3' Without
specific proof of inhuman conditions of confinement, a claimant
facing a long prison sentence in the United States will not be
able to establish that he risks being the victim of torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
to CIA reprisals); M. v. France, App. No. 10078/82, 41 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
103, 120 (1984) (denying claim by Romanian computer science lecturer in France
convicted of being a foreign intelligence agent and ordered expelled where he had
visited Romania several times without incident and where the effect of his staying in
France after completing his studies and his efforts to renounce citizenship were merely
speculative).
129 Virginia also promised the United Kingdom that prosecutors would tell the
judge that the extraditing country was against the imposition of the death penalty. See
Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 13.
'30 B., H. and L. v. Austria, App. No. 15776/89, 64 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &




Although petitioners sometimes present evidence of
prior episodes of ill treatment in requesting countries, such
personal narratives are not essential to establishing real risk of
victimization. 13 2 "[Tihe very nature of the regime . . .or ... a
particular situation in [the requesting] country" may be
sufficient to prove the existence of Article 3 violations.33 As a
result, the European Court and Commission have often
determined real risk on the basis of national and international
132 In the absence of strong corroborating evidence, the Commission and Court
have discounted petitioners' testimony about abuse. See, e.g., Cruz Varas v. Sweden,
201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991) (finding denial of asylum acceptable for Chilean whose
claims of torture were consistent with medical evidence but who had no direct evidence
and did not mention these claims in initial interviews with Swedish police); Kozlov v.
Finland, App. No. 16832/90, 69 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 321, 330-31 (1991)
(allowing extradition of man who hijacked a Soviet plane to Finland after he refused to
serve in the army based on conscientious objection and then claimed he was
hospitalized, forcibly injected with sulphuric substances, and declared mentally ill,
based on improving human rights situation, leniency of sentences for other hijackers,
and no evidence of likelihood of Article 3 violation).
133 K. and F. v. Netherlands, App. No. 12543/86, 51 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. 272, 276 (1986). At the same time, the Court and Commission have consistently
held in expulsion cases that a general situation of violence in a country did not
establish that the petitioner would face a real risk of being the victim of Article 3
violations. See Vilvarajah, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1 111 (denying claim that applicants
would face abuse if deported to Sri Lanka where their problems were not appreciably
different from those of all young male Tamils); H.L.R., 1997-II Eur. Ct. H.R. at 41-
42 (holding that a drug informant faced no real risk of retaliation from narco-
traffickers upon deportation to Colombia despite the general situation of violence
there). Challenges to deportations have been successful where petitioners have shown
they would be singled out for ill treatment. See, e.g., Chahal, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 93,
106 (Sikh activist prominently identified in Indian newspapers had shown real risk of
ill treatment upon expulsion to India). By contrast, extradition cases may cross the risk
threshold because of general situations in prisons. Jens Soering faced the same
inhuman conditions as ever other death row prisoner in Virginia; it was enough for the
European Court that he was targeted for prosecution. Cf Torture Convention, supra
note 100, at art. 3, § 2 ("For the purpose of determining whether there are [substantial
grounds for believing a person would be subjected to torture in a requesting state], the
competent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including,
where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights."); Tala, supra note 107, at 10.1 ("[Tlhe
Committee must take into account ... the existence of a consistent pattern of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights. The aim of the determination, however is
to establish whether the individual concerned would be personally at risk of being
subjected to torture in the country to which he or she would return. It follows that the
existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights
in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a
particular person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to
that country....").
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court decisions.. and general reports by government agencies
and nongovernmental organizations.3 ' Most notably, in Chahal
v. United Kingdom, the Court disallowed the deportation to
India of a prominent Sikh separatist, paying special attention
to evidence of widespread police misconduct in Punjab, as
reported by Amnesty International, the United Kingdom High
Commission in New Delhi, the United States Department of
State, the Indian National Human Rights Commission, and the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture.36  Such
evidence effectively established a presumption that Chahal
risked ill treatment in India. Neither the Indian government's
assurances that it would not violate Chahal's human rights. 7
nor reports that the human rights situation in India had
substantially improved since the initiation of expulsion
proceedings could overcome this presumption because India
had not implemented structural reforms suggested in earlier
reports. 8' Interestingly, the types of evidence that proved
134Ahmed, 71 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995) at 91 42-44 (disallowing an expulsion order
for Somalian refugee convicted of crimes in Austria and "attachling] particular weight"
to the fact that Austria had previously granted him asylum). See also Chahal, 70 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (1995) at 99 (accepting Amnesty International's allegations of extrajudicial
killings by Indian police in part because a United Kingdom Immigration Appeal
Tribunal accepted similar assertions in an unrelated case).
'35 See, e.g., Altun, 36 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep., at 232, 234 (1983)
(admitting an extradition challenge by a Turkish national who was active in politics,
given the undisputed fact that torture occurs in Turkey and that once extradited, the
national would lose his right of individual petition). Adjudications under the Torture
Convention have used similar evidence. See, e.g., Tala, supra note 107, at 11.5 ("The
Committee regretfully notes . . . that the practice of torture is still systematic in
Turkey, as attested to in [a Committee report to the U.N. General Assembly]."),
Mutombo v. Switzerland, Committee Against Torture, Comm. No. 13/1993, U.N. Doc.
A/49/44 at 45 (1994), at I9 3.2, 9.4-9.5 (blocking petitioner's deportation to Zaire given
his personal history of abuse, generally corroborating reports by Amnesty
International, and reports by the United Nations Secretary General, Special
Rapporteur on the question of torture, and the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances). See also Kisoki v. Sweden, Committee Against Torture,
Comm. No. 41/1996 (1996) (same).
"r'Chahal, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995) at 1 99, 102-05.
" Cf Y. v. Switzerland, App. No. 9012/80, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
205, 219 (1980) (finding no violation where Switzerland extradited an Indian national
wanted for fraud in Dubai, which accepted thirteen conditions to the effect that it
would honor Convention standards and had actually treated the petitioner well).
1
38 Chahal, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995) at T 103-05 ("Although the Court does not
doubt the good faith of the Indian Government in providing the assurances mentioned
above, it would appear that, despite the efforts of the Government, the NHRC and the
Indian courts to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by certain members
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crucial in Chahal exist in abundance on the topic of prison
conditions in the United States. If Chahal is any guidepost,
reports of persistent and recalcitrant problems in specific U.S.
prisons, coupled with a lack of judicial remedy, may go a long
way to establishing a prima facie case of Article 3 violation.
These issues are the subject of the next section.
B. Prison Conditions in the United States
In October 1999, the United States submitted a report
to the United Nations'Committee Against Torture detailing its
compliance with the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The
report stated that "overall, the country's law enforcement
agencies and correctional institutions set and maintain high
standards of conduct for their officers and treatment for
persons in their custody.""9 According to the government, such
high standards are partly the result of "strong policy guidance
and enforcement from the federal government, independent
promotional and investigative activities by knowledgeable non-
governmental groups and organizations, and the availability of
effective administrative and judicial remedies for those who
believe they have been the victims of abuse or excess.""'
Although this self-assessment may be optimistic and
retributive corrections policy in the United States is often
fundamentally at odds with rehabilitation-oriented European
systems,"' European human rights case law stands in general
of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India is a recalcitrant and enduring
problem.").
'39 U.S. Dep't of State, Initial Report of the United States of America to the
U.N. Committee Against Torture (Oct. 15, 1999), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/-
human-rights/-torture-geninfo.html.
14 Id.
141 See, e.g., Orientation Committee of the Human Rights Center, Human
Rights in Prison: The Professional Training of Prison Officials: Proceedings, at 58
(1995) (remarks of Vivien Stern)
I saw in San Quentin Prison, in California, the adjustment Centre.
The worst prisoners in that prison are kept there .... The prisoners
live in cells with barred doors like cages. They are never allowed out of
the cells unless they are handcuffed with their hands behind their
backs. They exercise in small yards covered with wire netting and
have few other activities except reading law books.
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agreement with the U.S. government's view of conditions in
American prisons. As described above, the European
Commission on Human Rights has refused to stand in the way
of extraditions to the United States merely because a relator
might face a lengthy prison term,12 presupposing that the
United States is in compliance with norms concerning the
treatment of prisoners.
Something more-specific evidence of specific practices
at specific prisons-is required for a successful claim. For
example, in Soering, because the majority of death row inmates
in Virginia were detained at the Mecklenburg Correctional
Center, the European Court could develop a focused picture
of life on death row based on state regulations and a federal
consent decree governing conditions there. Its decision was
based partly on abstract notions about the "ever-present and
mounting anguish of awaiting execution" and partly on the
"extreme conditions" on death row14 --that is, undisputed
evidence about cell size, the amount and types of recreation
permitted, visitation policies, medical services, lockdown
procedures, "death house" conditions for those facing imminent
execution, and "channels by which grievances may be
In contrast, in Scotland, in a high-security prison called Shotts,
there is a special high security building, surrounded by a garden. The
building consists of small rooms arranged around a living area where
activities take place, such as cooking education, discussions and group
meetings. The unit is for some of Scotland's most dangerous prisoners.
Id. See also Report of the Mission to the United States of America on the Issue of
Violence Against Women in State and Federal Prisons: Report of the Special Rapporteur
on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc.
EICN.411999/68/Add.2., at 30 (1999) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur on Violence
Against Women] ("[Tihe Special Rapporteur found that the recent trend in prison
management highlights the punishment aspect of imprisonment. 'Done the Crime, Do
the Time' was a slogan repeated to the Special Rapporteur numerous times."); id. at
83 ("The Special Rapporteur is concerned that the attitude of the California
correctional authorities seems largely to be that reflected in the 1977 revision to
section 3000 of the California Penal Code which expressly changed the objective of
prisons from 'rehabilitation and punishment' to 'punishment' only."). Cf Roberta M.
Harding, In the Belly of the Beast: A Comparison of the Evolution and Status of
Prisoners' Rights in the United States and Europe, 27 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 46, 48-
49 (1998) (noting that European human rights bodies have maintained a commitment
to expanding prisoners' rights while the United States judiciary has curtailed them).142
See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
143 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 26.
'" Id. at 44-45.
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ventilated."4 ' In order to be successful outside the death row
context, a claimant would have to paint a similarly precise
picture of objectively "extreme conditions."
The United States report to the Committee Against
Torture raised several areas of concern regarding conditions in
American prisons and juvenile facilities, including
overcrowding, deteriorating physical infrastructure,
inadequate medical care, racism and sexual abuse, sensory
deprivation at "supermax" security units, and the
inappropriate use of tear gas, pepper spray, stun guns and stun
belts, guard dogs, cuffs and shackles.14 Although the report
explained the problem areas as "aberrational situations" in a
general policy of compliance with international norms,47 they
provide a starting point for issues likely to be raised in an
extradition challenge. The sections that follow will survey
problem areas in American prison administration that may
make for some of the strongest claims that an extradition
relator would face a "real risk" of being the victim of Article 3
violations. The first sections will consider general problems
that may apply to numerous claims, as well as general
defenses that work strongly in the United States's favor. Abuse
of women prisoners will receive more specific attention, as will
the mistreatment of juveniles and sensory deprivation in
"supermax" security units. One of the reasons the U.S. report
identified these problem areas is the scrutiny given them by
scholarly commentary and reports by governmental and non-
governmental organizations.'48 Rather than retreading the
145 Id. at 26-28. The court declined to consider evidence about risk of rape and
physical assault at Mecklenburg, which was presented by Soering and "strongly
contested" by the United Kingdom and the Virginia Department of Corrections. Id. at
27.
:46 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 139.147 Id. ("Torture does not occur in the United States except in aberrational
situations and never as a matter of policy. When it does, it constitutes a serious
criminal offense, subjecting the perpetrators to prosecution and entitling the victims to
various remedies, including rehabilitation and compensation."); Harold Hongju Koh,
U.S. Dep't of State, On-the-Record Briefing (Oct. 15, 1999), at http://www.state.gov/-
www/policy-remarks/1999/991015_kohrpt~torture.html ("We've erred on the side of
completeness.").
148 See, e.g., Amnesty International, Violations in Prisons and Jails: Needless
Brutality, in RIGHTS FOR ALL (1998), available at http://www.rightsforall-
usa.org/info/reportlr04.htm (focusing on overcrowding, privatization of prisons,
physical brutality by guards, sexual abuse, supermaximum security units, inadequate
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ground covered by these studies, the discussion that follows
will assess the strength of the available evidence in light of
European human rights case law and the United States's
strongest defenses.
1. General Claims
In 1984, a Canadian national named Michael Lucian
Gwynne was sentenced to sixty years in Alabama prison for
two counts of attempted extortion. After nine years in custody,
he escaped to Canada. When the United States sought his
extradition, he attempted to stay the proceedings on the
ground that conditions in Alabama prisons violated the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Even though the
British Columbia Court of Appeal held in 1998 that the
conditions in Alabama prisons did not sufficiently "shock the
conscience" to justify ruling in Gwynne's favor, his allegations
exemplify the kind of challenge that may work in the European
Court of Human Rights. In an affidavit to the British Columbia
Court of Appeal, Gwynne described living double-bunked in
small cells "infested with cockroaches, spiders, snakes, rats,
and mice."150 Brutal beatings by guards and stabbings and rape
among inmates were weekly occurrences.'51 Prisoners were
malnourished.'52 When Gwynne had dental problems, he was
denied medical care; at various points during his incarceration,
he had to remove stitches with a razor blade and pull one of his
own teeth. "'
healthcare, juvenile corrections, and the improper use of restraints, stun devices,
pepper spray, and teargas).
149 See Gwynne v. Canada [1998] 50 Canadian Rights Reporter [C.R.R.2d] 250
(B.C.C.A.) (Can.).
10 Id. at app. A 7, 8 ("On my first night in Holman [Prison] I was lying in
bed and I felt something crawling over me. They were cockroaches. This became a daily
thing for the next nine years. You wake up in the middle of the night, cockroaches
crawling down your neck, on your arms, under your bedclothes.").
151Id. at 1 11, 39 ("You're not safe in your own cell when the guards will open
the door to let people in to stab you or beat you."); id. at 43 ("We had stabbings every
week, if not more often.").
12 Id at 11 13-14, 38 (describing boxes of food for prisoners marked "not for
human consumption").
6 Id. at 34-35. Cf Council of Europe, supra note 98, Rule 26.3, at 11 ("The
services of a qualified dental officer shall be available to every prisoner.").
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Nearly every prison system in the United States is
overcrowded and underfunded. 54  Government and non-
governmental observers have described squalid conditions of
confinement, including problems with sewage, bug infestation,
and lack of ventilation.' 5 Increased physical attacks, sexual
assaults, and suicide among prisoners have resulted from the
stresses incident to double- and triple-bunking inmates in
already cramped cells, as well as from the inability of
overwhelmed guards to protect vulnerable prisoners. 5 6 Guards
have increasingly relied on electric stun devices to control
prisoners. 157 Poor diets and the lack of adequate medical and
mental health care are also common consequences of
underfunded systems.5 8 Such treatment is, by European Court
1 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, by year end 1998, state
prisons were operating at between thirteen and twenty-two percent over-capacity,
while federal prisons were twenty-seven percent above capacity. See Bureau of Justice
Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Prison Statistics, at http'/www.ojp.us-
doj.govlbjs/prisons.htm (last revised Apr. 20, 2000); U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 139,
at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human.rights/-torture-articles.html ("Although a
significant percentage of the nation's correctional facilities are relatively new, many
are not, and in recent years virtually all have been subject to the pressures of
overcrowding and the lack of adequate funding. As a result, the conditions in the
nation's prisons have continued to be a matter of concern.").
's See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 148; Bill Lann Lee, U.S. Dep't
of Justice, Letter to James Geringer, Governor of Wyoming, part f at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/wyofind.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2002).
("[Diuring out tour, we observed several bags of flour that had been torn open by
rodents as rodent prints were evident in the spilled flour.... The absence of vacuum
breakers at a number of critical locations in [Wyoming State Penitentiary's] plumbing
system jeopardizes the entire potable water supply.... Inmate workers in the coal ash
operation were not wearing adequate respiratory protection equipment. We observed
an inmate worker covered with coal ash from head to toe, including around his nose
and mouth.").
15 Amnesty International, supra note 148; Mike Davis, The Politics of Super
Incarceration, in CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: CONFRONTING THE PRISON CRISIS 73, 73-74
(Elihu Rosenblatt ed., 1996); Jessica Saunders, Corrections Tries Triple Bunk Beds,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Dec. 5, 1995, at 3B; Mike Cason, Corrections Officers
Fearful After Cutbacks, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER, Jan. 27, 1996, at 3F.
157 Amnesty International, Cruelty in Control?: The Stun Belt and Other
Electro-Shock Equipment in Law Enforcement, AMR 51/54/99 (June 8, 1999), at
http//www.anmesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AMR510541999 (noting that twenty states
authorize the use of stun belts, and more than 1000 belts are in circulation in more
than 100 jurisdictions, used in court, when transporting prisoners, and in prisons);
Shelley A. Nieto Dahlberg, The React Security Belt: Stunning Prisoners and Human
Rights Groups Into Questioning Whether Its Use Is Permissible Under the United States
and Texas Constitutions, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 239 (1998) (describing practices in Texas).
1See, e.g., Amnesty International, supra note 148; Lee, supra note 155
(describing "inadequate" medical care, "considerable difficulty administering
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standards, arguably inhuman and certainly falls well below the
Council of Europe's standard minimum rules for the treatment
of prisoners.'
Additionally, the United States report to the Committee
Against Torture noted the concerns of "[s]ome prisoners' rights
advocates" that the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA7) has
undermined inmates' abilities to seek judicial redress for
abuses of their rights.' Such concerns about flawed
mechanisms for enforcing and remedying rights violations may
well prove important because challenges to extradition will
hinge on the persistence and recalcitrance of inhuman
conditions of confinement. As prison officials aggressively move
to lift consent decrees, even amid charges of continuing
abuse,16' relators in extradition proceedings can argue
compellingly that they would face Article 3 violations without
hope of remedy in United States courts.
2. Government Responses
A fugitive alleging poor prison conditions in a particular
state may succeed if supported by a large quantity of facility-
prescribed medications," and "critically deficient" mental health care at the Wyoming
State Penitentiary).
19 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
160 U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 139 ("Congress passed this law to establish
more restrictive standards for the entry and continuation of prospective injunctive
relief regarding conditions of confinement in prisons, jails, and juvenile facilities. This
law was a response to the large number of frivolous or harassing prisoner suits which
have . . . grown to become the single largest category of federal civil rights cases,
constituting approximately 17% of the federal district court civil docket and 22% of
federal civil appeals. The new law requires that, before an inmate can file a civil rights
action in Federal court, he or she must (i) exhaust all available administrative
remedies, and (ii) show physical injury to receive damages for mental or emotional
injury suffered while in custody. In addition, the law generally prohibits an inmate
from filing a petition in forma pauperis (as an indigent without liability for court fees
and costs) if the inmate has filed three or more actions in federal court that were
dismissed as frivolous or malicious or for failing to state a claim upon which relief
could be granted."). See also Brief for Amicus Curiae Law Professors, Harris v. Garner,
190 F.3d 1279, vacated for rehearing en banc, 197 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 1999), available
at http://diana.law.yale.edu/diana/db/110998-2.html (arguing that the PLRA violates
the Torture Convention); Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note
141, 33 (noting concerns that the PLRA cuts off access to federal courts, "the primary
recourse pursued by prisoners").
161 See John Sullivan, States and Cities Removing Prisons from Courts' Grip,
N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 2000, at 1.
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specific evidence, but such a defense is nevertheless difficult to
win. The European Court and Commission depend on Council
of Europe member nations to stay extradition proceedings
voluntarily while the human rights tribunals consider an
application. 62  These nations are less likely to comply
voluntarily with stays of extradition if it is too easy to make an
Article 3 claim and the risk of turning Europe into a safe haven
for American criminals becomes sufficiently compelling." As a
point of comparison, such concerns of legitimacy in the face of
serious "safe haven" risks were, at least until the recent
decision of United States v. Burns,"M at the core of Canadian
extradition jurisprudence, which is extremely deferential to
decisions made by executive branch authorities and has shown
far greater reluctance to block extraditions on human rights
grounds than the European Court or Commission." Although
162 See GILBERT, supra note 86, at 152 ("It ought to be noted that Rule 36 of the
[European Convention Rules of Procedure] only allows the Commission to indicate to
the requested State that it wishes a stay in the domestic proceedings, it cannot compel
such an action. However, most States comply with the request, and thus the
extradition is delayed until the Commission considers the application.") (citations
omitted).
" Cf. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35.
16 1 S.C.R. 283, 65 (Can.) ("[I]n the absence of exceptional circumstances,...
assurances in death penalty cases are always constitutionally required.").
165 Canadian courts will only block extraditions on human rights grounds
where conduct in the requesting state "sufficiently shocks the conscience" and would be
"fundamentally unacceptable to our society." This standard has proved to be extremely
difficult to meet. See, e.g., R. v. Schmidt, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 500 (Can.) ("[I]n most cases, at
least, judicial intervention should await the exercise of executive discretion. For the
decision to surrender is that of the executive authorities, not the courts, and it should
not be lightly assumed that they will overlook their duty to obey constitutional norms
by surrendering an individual to a foreign country under circumstances where doing so
would be fundamentally unjust."); Kindler v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [1991] 2
S.C.R. 779 (Can.) (finding no violation of Canadian Charter of Rights where minister
allowed extradition to United States of fugitive facing capital punishment without
seeking assurances that the death penalty would not be imposed); United States v.
Jamieson [1996] 1 S.C.R. 465 (Can.) (holding that mandatory minimum drug sentences
in the United States did not shock the conscience); Gwynne v. Canada, [19981 50
C.R.R.2d 250 (B.C.C.A.) (Can.); Mexico v. Hurley, [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 414 (Ont. C.A.)
(Can.) (accepting reports by Amnesty International and other groups that there are
continuing human rights abuses in Mexico against gays involving police and military
but nevertheless allowing the extradition of a gay man accused of murdering his lover
in Mexico because of assurances by the Mexican government that the relator would not
be mistreated and that Canadian officials would be allowed to visit him in prison);
Zolfiqar v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration [1999] No. IMM-5694-98, 1999 Fed.
Ct. Trial Lexis 211, at *5 (Fed. Ct. Trial. Div.) (Can.) (finding no substantial grounds
for believing that deportee member of persecuted Afghan minority would be in danger
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the European human rights tribunals have responsibilities to
apply international human rights norms that differ greatly
from the mandate of Canadian courts, 66 the European Court
and Commission may interpret strictly the Article 3
requirements of minimum severity and real risk rather than
test the limits of their institutional competence.
Prison conditions challenges not involving death row
scenarios will undoubtedly hinge on disputed points of fact,
which the Soering Court showed great reluctance to consider. 67
Establishing minimum severity and real risk would become
difficult in the face of arguments that no systematic abuse
exists, reported incidents of abuse were aberrations affecting
only a small fraction of prisoners, conditions have improved,
the Department of Justice has effectively policed prison
conditions, the vast majority of prisoner litigation is frivolous,
and inmates continue to have unrestricted access to state
of being subjected to torture in Afghanistan); Suresh v. Canada, [1999] 65 C.R.R.2d
344 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div.) (Can.) (finding that Tamil activist facing deportation to Sri
Lanka had not established the substantial grounds for believing he would be tortured
there); Singh v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, [1997] No. IMM-5294-97,
1997 Fed. Ct. Trial Lexis 1465, 7 (Fed. Ct. Trial Div.) (Can.) (requiring Sikh detainee
facing deportation to India to show "demonstrable probability" of police brutality upon
return to India) ("Sometimes police agents, in a high emotion of self-righteous God-
playing wrath, harm prisoners, even in Canada, which is not facing concerted
organized terrorism. The State which employs those police officers ought ruthlessly to
stamp out police brutality, but it happens, even in peaceful societies. No country's
deportation laws or extradition laws could ever operate if such a deplorable but
everyday risk stopped their enforcement."). See also ANNE WARNER LA FOREST, LA
FoREST'S EXTRADITION TO AND FROM CANADA 199-212 (3d ed. 1991). The only reported
case of a Canadian coures refusal to extradite someone wanted in the United States
involved an extradition for telemarketing fraud, in which an American prosecutor went
on Canadian television and demanded that a group of conspirators waive all challenges
to extradition, saying, "You're going to be the boyfriend of a very bad man if you wait
out your extradition." United States v. Cobb, [1997 Weekly Criminal Bulletin and
Judgments [W.C.B.J.] LEXIS 14080, at **39-40 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) (Can.). For a
thorough examination of Canadian extradition and human rights, see Paul Michell,
Domestic Rights and International Responsibilities: Extradition Under the Canadian
Charter, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 141 (1998).
"6 See Anne Mori Kobayashi, Note, International and Domestic Approaches to
Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights: Reconciling the Soering and Kindler
Decisions, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 225 (1996). See also The International Judicial
Dialogue: When Domestic Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L.
REv. 2049 (May 2001).
167 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 42-43 (considering only
uncontested facts and disregarding evidence of widespread sexual assaults and other
violence on death row).
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courts and can fully seek injunctive relief in federal courts.
Where such arguments are made, Soering may be less the rule
than Kozlov v. Finland, a 1991 Commission ruling that allowed
the extradition of a man who hijacked a Soviet plane to
Finland.168 The Commission ignored the relator's claim that he
had been declared mentally ill and forcibly injected with
sulfuric substances as punishment for refusing military
service, basing its decision instead on evidence that the human
rights situation was improving and that sentences for other
hijackers had been lenient.169
Where a decision in a relator's favor would encourage
fugitives to come to Europe, a successful claim becomes much
harder to make. Yet such claims are far from impossible, and it
may even be strategically advantageous for relators to bring
cases that would likely go against them. Before considering
how the European Court might decide the difficult issues
inherent in some likely extradition scenarios and how its
decisions might affect U.S. policy, it is worth examining a
series of more specialized claims that would affect fewer
prisoners and are supported by a large amount of undisputed
evidence. Cases involving women's prisons, juvenile facilities,
and supermax prisons would seriously implicate neither
European security interests nor the legitimacy of the regional
human rights tribunals, yet decisions blocking their
extraditions would still be embarrassing and invasive for the
United States.
3. Claims by Women Prisoners
Women facing extradition to the United States have
compelling claims that they would face sexual abuse,
inadequate medical care, and the inappropriate use of shackles
in certain American prisons. The types of evidence supporting
such claims-court decisions and reports by the U.S.
government, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, and Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch-have historically carried a large amount of persuasive
(1991).
'0 Kozlov v. Finland, App. No. 16832/90 69 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 321
..
9 Id. at 330-3 1.
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authority with the European Court and Commission,'0
effectively putting a burden on the United States to show that
abusive conditions have abated.' Because of the relatively
discrete number of women's prisons, 2 relators in extradition
proceedings can predict with reasonable certainty the kinds of
conditions that await them in the United States, bolstering
their chances of establishing the "real risk" element of an
Article 3 defense.'
Numerous reports produced in recent years by
governmental and non-governmental entities have detailed the
mistreatment of women prisoners, and between 1997 and 1999,
the Department of Justice investigated, litigated, and settled
high-profile cases involving women's prisons in Michigan and
Arizona." Individual and class actions by prisoners have
17o See, e.g., Chahal, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995) at 1 99, 102-05; Aksoy, 1996-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1 80.
171 See supra notes 134-38.
'7 Women comprise approximately 6.5 % of the prison population in the
United States. The 84,427 women in prison at year-end 1998 marked a 92 % increase
from the number of female prisoners in 1990. See Allen J. Beck & Christopher J.
Mumola, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Prisoners in 1998 (Aug. 1999),
http/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstractp98.htm. Twenty-one states and New York City
keep all women inmates in one single-sex prison, and nineteen-including California,
Michigan, Texas, and Virginia-maintain between two and six women's prisons. See
National Institute of Corrections, Current Issues in the Operation of Women's Prisons,
in SPECIAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS 2, 8-11 (Sept. 1998), available at,
http//www.nicic.org/pubs/1998/014784.pdf. Hawaii, Illinois, New Hampshire and
Oregon house women prisoners in same-sex and co-correctional facilities, and Alaska,
Kansas, Maine, North Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia house them in co-
correctional facilities only. See id.
' Cf. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 42.
174 See, e.g., United States v. Arizona, No. 97-476-PHX-ROS, Settlement
Agreement (Mar. 1999), http:/www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/azsa.htm (detailing
Arizona's agreement to strengthen sexual misconduct policies, increase pre-
employment screening and training of guards, and educate inmates about their rights
with respect to sexual misconduct by guards); United States v. Michigan, No. 97-CVB-
71514-BDT, Settlement Agreement (May 25, 1999), http://www.usdoj.gov/crttsplit-
/documentslmichigansa.htm (same); United States v. Michigan, No. 97-CVB-71514-
BDT, Complaint (Mar. 10, 1997), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/splitldocuments/mich-
comp.htm (alleging widespread sexual misconduct at Crane Correctional Facility and
Scott Correctional Facility); Deval L. Patrick, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter to J. Fife
Symington, Governor of Arizona, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documentsazwo-
find.htm (finding that "sexual misconduct is occurring in [Arizona Department of
Corrections] facilities with constitutionally unacceptable frequency" and that "male
correctional officers... engage in frequent, prolonged, close-up and prurient viewing of
female inmates showering and using toilet facilities."). See also Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, supra note 141; Cheryl Bell et al., Rape and Sexual
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brought additional facts to light.'75 From these disparate
strands of evidence, pictures of widespread abuse in several
states have come into focus.'76 For example, prison conditions
in Michigan have received enormous outside scrutiny for the
"truly shocking" amount of sexual misconduct by male guards,
verbal abuse, inappropriate use of shackles, pat-down searches,
and "frequent, prolonged, close-up and prurient viewing [of
female inmates] during dressings, showering and use of
facilities. 77 By European standards, such conditions would
undoubtedly be inhuman or degrading," even more so in cases
Misconduct in the Prison System: Analyzing America's Most 'Open" Secret, 18 YALE L.
& POLY REV. 195, 205-18 (1999); Special Report: Women in Prison, Nowhere to Hide
(NBC television broadcast, Sept. 10, 1999) (detailing sexual abuse and the use of
teargas and shackles in Michigan women's prisons).
175 See, e.g., Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Dep't of Corrections
v. District of Columbia, 968 F. Supp. 744 (D.D.C. 1997) (issuing injunctive relief
regarding sexual harassment policies, medical care, educational and vocational
programs, environmental health and fire safety); Shumate v. Wilson, No. Civ. 5 95 619
(WBS) (JFM) (N.D. Cal. 1996) (describing life-threateningly deficient medical care in
two California women's prisons). See also Mark Andrew Sherman, Indirect
Incorporation of Human Rights Treaty Provisions in Criminal Cases in United States
Courts, 3 ILSA J. IN''L & COMP. L. 719, 735-40 (1997) (describing cases about the
sexual abuse and medical mistreatment of women prisoners); Bell et al., supra note
174, at 206-18 (examining recent prisoner litigation); National Institute of Corrections,
Sexual Misconduct in Prisons: Law, Agency Response, and Prevention, in SPECIAL
ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS 4 (Nov. 1996) (surveying recent litigation relating to sexual
misconduct). Inmates generally lose claims alleging sexual misconduct. The U.S.
General Accounting Office conducted a study of staff sexual misconduct in Texas,
California, and federal women's prisons. From 1995 to 1998, only ninety-two of 506
allegations were sustained on administrative review. During that period, the Federal
Bureau of Prisons was involved in fourteen lawsuits; California faced two suits; and
Texas faced four, involving fifteen inmates. See U.S. General Accounting Office, Women
in Prison: Sexual Misconduct by Correctional Staff, GAO/GGD-99-104 at 8, 12 (June
1999).
... Examples of states with exemplary records have also emerged. See, e.g.,
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 141, at J1 34, 49, 152-69
(describing humane conditions of confinement in Minnesota).
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 141, at 145-
48 ("The abuse taking place is truly shocking."); United States v. Michigan, No. 97-
CVB-71514-BDT, Complaint at 16. See also Amnesty International, "Not a Part of
My Sentence": Violations of the Human Rights of Women in Custody (Mar. 1999)
http'//www.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AMR510011999.htm ("In October 1998, inmates
and a guard reported to Amnesty International that sexual abuse of female inmates by
staff continues to occur."); Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide: Retaliation Against
Michigan Women Prisoners (July 1998), http://www.hrw.org/reports98/women/
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide]; Human Rights Watch, All Too
Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State Prisons (Dec. 1996) [hereinafter
Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar].
'78 See supra notes 110-14, 124 and accompanying text.
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involving relators who have a history of abuse, like the
majority of women prisoners.7"
Numerous other states engage in practices that are
contrary to international norms. The widespread practice of
using male guards to supervise women prisoners runs contrary
to the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for Prisoners and
European practice,18 and lawsuits involving cross-gender pat-
searches have involved prisons from Oregon to Connecticut.''
The U.N. Special Rapporteur criticized a general lack of
attention to the "distinct health-care needs" of women. 82 When
a member of the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture accompanied two Amnesty International researchers
on a visit to Valley State Prison for Women in California, she
expressed serious concern with conditions in administrative
segregation units, the practice of shackling hospitalized
women, and the employment of male guards who are
authorized to conduct pat searches and have access to areas
where women shower and are strip searched. 8'
17 See Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 177, at n.8
and accompanying text; Lynn Smith, Majority of State's Women Inmates Abused as
Children, Warden Says, L-A. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1992, at 5, available at 1992 WL
2937221. Cf Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 43.
no Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 141, at 56
(citing Rule 53(3), Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners). Although
the 1987 revision of the European Prison Rules encourages "[tihe appointment of staff
in institutions... housing prisoners of the opposite sex," Rule 62, the main effect of the
new rule was to increase female staff at men's prisons. European practice
overwhelmingly favors the view that "at any given time and in any situation in custody
there should always be at least as many female staff supervising any women prisoners
as there are male staff." Sylvia Casale, A Visit to Valley State Prison, Amnesty Int'l
Rep. (Apr. 1999), at http'//www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/AMR510551999.htm
(quoting PRISONS AND HUMN RIGHTS, MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL PRISON STANDARDS
FOR USE IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 95 (1999)).
181 See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525, 1528 (9th Cir. 1993)
(describing cross-gender body searches of a psychologically vulnerable population of
abuse survivors as "an infliction of pain" prohibited by the Eighth Amendment); Peddle
v. Sawyer, 64 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D. Conn. 1999) (describing abusive pat searches at
the Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut).
182 See Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 141, at
64-67.
' 8 Casale, supra note 180 ("In Europe the CPT has identified regime elements
that could be considered to amount to inhuman treatment, [including] very limited
direct staff/inmate contacts, frequent body searches, . . . too little time out of cell,
association with a small number of inmates, ... This reads like a description of the
regime in the Ad Seg and SHU at VSPW."). See also Amnesty International, The
Findings of a Visit to Valley State Prison for Women, California (Apr. 1999) (criticizing
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In its favor, the United States can argue that most
evidence of mistreatment was compiled in the context of
investigations that have yielded significant reform efforts and
improvements.'8 In Michigan, for example, the state's
settlement agreement with federal authorities led to a six-
month moratorium on cross-gender pat searches,185 and an
expert chosen by Michigan and the United States reported that
Michigan had "implemented significant new policies and
procedures" and substantially complied with the settlement. 86
International observers have remarked on the night-and-day
improvement of Georgia's women prisons after a class action
suit led to a media storm and a permanent injunction.87 Other
class actions have yielded similarly encouraging results.' Over
the last decade, most states have criminalized sexual
a "blanket policy" of keeping hospitalized prisoners in shackles, the lack of independent
monitoring of prison health care standards, the authorization of male guards to
conduct pat searches and to watch strip searches, and "cruel, inhuman or degrading"
conditions in administrative segregation); Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women, supra note 141, at 87, 91-92, 94-99, 101, 109 (describing California's
"inadequate administrative or penal protection against sexual misconduct in custody,"
cross-gender pat- and strip-searches, the "constant fear of rape" by male guards among
women in administrative segregation, and inadequate health services); Human Rights
Watch, All Too Familiar, supra note 177.
'
8 4 See Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 141, at 1 59
("Though sexual misconduct remains a serious problem in United States women's
prisons, recent court cases and awareness campaigns have result in some encouraging
changes . . "); Amnesty International, supra note 177, at n.132 and accompanying
text.
8 United States v. Michigan, No. 97-CVB-71514-BDT, Settlement Agreement
(May 25, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crttsplitldocuments/michigansa.htm.
18 U.S. Dep't of Justice, United States' Memorandum in Support of
Stipulation to Dismiss, United States v. Michigan, No. 97-CV-71514 (Mar. 7, 2000),
available at http'/www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/michmemo.htm (last visited Mar.
24, 2001).
'87 See Cason v. Seckinger, Civ. No. 84-313-1-MAC (M.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 1994);
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 141, at 911 18, 121, 124
("[Tihe Special Rapporteur was able to confirm that, although prior to Cason, sexual
abuse and harassment was widespread in women's prisons in Georgia, . . . the
situation has improved and awareness about the seriousness of sexual misconduct in
prisons has greatly increased."); Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar, supra note
177, at 135-37; Eric Harrison, Nearly 200 Women Have Told of Being Raped, Abused in
a Georgia Prison Scandal So Broad Even Officials Say It's a 13-Year Nightmare, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1992, at El, available at 1992 WL 2821314.
' See Amy Laderberg, Note, The "Dirty Little Secret" Why Class Actions Have
Emerged as the Only Viable Option for Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy the
Subjective Prong of the Eighth Amendment in Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40
WM. & MARY L. REV. 323, 326-28 (1998).
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misconduct by prison guards, and the Department of Justice
has made investigating conditions in women's prisons a
priority.
189
Nevertheless, structural reforms and continuing
investigations have failed to resolve many problems in women's
prisons. The criminalization of guard misconduct has not been
accompanied by better staff training and has done little by
itself to halt sexual abuse.190 Human Rights Watch has argued
that the Department of Justice's investigative and enforcement
efforts have targeted too few states and that its settlement
agreements with Arizona and Michigan are "flawed and
weak."'9' No systematic implementation of Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International's recommendations has
'9 See National Institute of Corrections, supra note 175; U.S. General
AccountingF Office, supra note 175; Bell et al., supra note 174.
See National Institute of Corrections, supra note 175, at 2 (noting that
despite laws prohibiting sexual abuse of female prisoners, "relatively few DOCs have
looked closely at whether and to what extent their policies and practices offer clear
direction to staff and inmates on the issue of sexual misconduct"); Officials Consider
CO Segregation by Gender, CORRECTIONS PROFESSIONAL, Nov. 19, 1999 ("[In late
October, Virginia officials ordered an investigation into complaints of widespread
sexual abuse by male [corrections officers] at the state's largest women's prison. In the
past nine months, there have been 25 sexual misconduct complaints at the Virginia
Correctional Center for Women.").
'9' Human Rights Watch, United States, in World Report 2000, available at
http'//www.hrw.org/hrw/wr2kfUs.htm.
The U.S. government has bungled its response to the sexual abuse
women face in state prisons. During the year, the Justice Department
reached negotiated settlements . . . in only two cases under
consideration that involved sexual abuse of incarcerated women in two
states. The settlement reached in the Arizona case.., allowed Arizona
Department of Corrections officials to place women in solitary
confinement after they file a complaint of sexual abuse, an act the
women perceived to be punitive. The settlement failed both to set up a
mechanism through which women could safely file complaints without
fear of retaliation and to establish independent oversight of the
system.
The settlement reached with the Michigan Department of
Corrections was a travesty, with all of the flaws of the Arizona
settlement, but also including elements that actually placed the
women at increased risk of sexual abuse. One of its most disturbing
aspect [sic] was the imposition of uniforms on the women. This sent a
message to the women that they 'provoked' sexual assaults and
provided another means for corrections staff to punish them.
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taken place.'92 Evidence that prison officials have retaliated
against prisoners who have made complaints93 and have
refused to allow outside investigations of women's facilities"
reinforce a basic presumption that ill treatment remains
prevalent in many states. In states operating under consent
decrees, the reluctance of many victims to report sexual abuse
has hampered reform efforts, as have institutional inertia and
the political power of correctional unions.9 " Even where
reforms are taking root, the PLRA requires that consent
decrees be lifted upon a bare showing that constitutional
violations have ceased, raising questions about how long
reforms will last.' A further provision of the PLRA prohibits
damages for mental or emotional injury absent a prior showing
of physical injury, directly affecting lawsuits by women
inmates.' 97 Such evidence, showing the recalcitrance of the
problems and the courts' limited ability to give redress, would
strongly militate in favor of women contesting extradition
before European human rights tribunals. 8 In the absence of
certifiably humane alternate housing facilities, the United
States might have a difficult time negotiating around Article 3.
192 See Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 177; Amnesty
International, supra note 177.
'3 See Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 177.
:' See Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, supra note 141, at 9.
'5 See Mark I. Soler, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sept.
25, 1996 (describing how Georgia often discounted claims of sexual abuse even when
complainants passed and guards failed polygraph tests); Rhonda Cook, Prison Guard
Accused of Abusing Female Inmates Is Rehired, ATL. J. & CONST., July 12, 1994, at B1,
available at 1994 WL 4465595 (describing how prosecutors were dropping rape and
assault charges against a Georgia prison official and how he was being rehired at a
male facility with back pay and a settlement bonus, even though the firing was upheld
by the state Personnel Board).
'96 See Sullivan, supra note 161; U.S. Dep't of Justice, CRIPA Report (1997), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/cripa97.htm ("When jurisdictions comply with
consent decree requirements and correct unlawful conditions in the institution, the
Section joins defendants in a motion to dismiss the consent decree.") (detailing six
dismissals based upon joint motions of the parties).
197 See Daniel J. Sharfstein, Note, No Cure for a Broken Heart, 108 YALE L.J.
2451 (1999); Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The
Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 66 n.325 (1997); Julie M. Riewe, Note, The Least
Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117, 153 (1997):
... Cf. Chahal, 70 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995) at 105.
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4. Claims by Juveniles
Because the question of whether a practice is inhuman
or degrading may depend on the vulnerability and special
needs of a claimant, the European Court and Commission have
more readily found Article 3 violations in cases involving
youthful offenders.'99 Children have potentially strong Article 3
defenses to extradition based on poor conditions in juvenile
detention facilities and the growing practice of charging
juveniles as adults and housing them with adult populations.
In the United States, governmental and non-governmental
entities have documented widespread problems in numerous
state and territorial juvenile justice systems. These abuses
include overcrowded, poorly lit, unventilated, and vermin-
infested conditions of confinement; sanctioned physical abuse
by guards and among detainees; malnutrition; a paucity of
education, health, and mental health services; and excessive
use of restraints and solitary confinement." When viewed
'9 See Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 43. See also supra notes 121-26
and accompanying text.
210 See, e.g., Bill Lann Lee, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter to Zell Miller, Governor
of Georgia, available at http'I/www.usdoj.gov/crtlsplit/documents/gajuvfind.htm (last
visited Apr. 19, 2002) ("Our investigation identified a pattern of egregious conditions
violating the federal rights of youths in the Georgia juvenile facilities we toured. These
violations include the failure to provide adequate mental health care...; overcrowded
and unsafe conditions... ; abusive disciplinary practices,... including physical abuse
by staff and abusive use of mechanical and chemical restraints on mentally ill youths;
inadequate education and rehabilitative services; and inadequate medical care in
certain areas."); Isabelle Katz Pinzler, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter to Mike Foster,
Governor of Louisiana, available at, http'//www.usdoj.gov/crtfsplitldocuments/lajuv-
findl.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2002) (finding physical abuse and corporal punishment
by guards, "abusive use of mace," policies permitting juveniles to be "hog-tied," solitary
confinement, inadequate medical and mental health care, inadequate education
services, restrictive visitation policies, and lack of access to courts); Deval L. Patrick,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Letter to Brereton C. Jones, Governor of Kentucky, available at
http'/www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/k3juvfind.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2002)
(describing abusive solitary confinement, inadequate health services, overcrowding,
staffing shortages, and inadequate abuse investigations); Steven H. Rosenbaum, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Remarks Before the Fourteenth Annual National Juvenile Corrections
and Detention Forum (May 16, 1999), at http:J/www.usdoj.gov/crtlsplit/documents/-
juvspeech.htm (describing U.S. D.O.J. investigations process and expressing general
concerns about overcrowding, lack of attention to the special needs of very young and
mentally ill juveniles, the increased use of restraints, chemical sprays and solitary
confinement, and the need for proper educational services); Patricia Puritz & Mary
Ann Scali, Beyond the Walls: Improving Conditions of Confinement for Youth in
Custody, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep't of Justice
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against the comparatively mild treatment ruled to be inhuman
or degrading by the European Court and Commission,
conditions as reported in juvenile facilities in the United States
cross the Article 3 threshold."' Although conditions in many
juvenile facilities have improved in direct response to
investigations and consent decrees, the volume of evidence to
the contrary suggests that the government party to an
extradition challenge will often bear a burden of showing that
present conditions do not violate Article 3.
A separate basis for challenges to extraditions of
juveniles lies in the growing ease with which states can try
juveniles as adults and place them in adult prisons.0 2 Such
practices, which expose a vulnerable class of people to physical
and sexual abuse, violate international norms requiring the
separation of juveniles from adult offenders.0  Two years ago,
California voters approved a ballot measure that gives
(Jan. 1998), at http'//www.ojjdp.ncjrs.orgpubs/wallssect-O1.html#8 (noting
investigations in Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, and
Virginia); Barbara Allen-Hagen, Conditions of Confinement in Juvenile Detention and
Correctional Facilities, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Fact
Sheet #1 (Apr. 1993), at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesfs-9301.txt (describing "serious
and widespread problems ... in the areas of living space, health care, institutional
security and safety, and control of suicidal behavior" and "pervasive" overcrowding that
affected more than 75 percent of the confined population between 1987 and 1991);
Human Rights Watch, No Minor Matter: Children in Maryland's Jails (1999), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/maryland/Maryland-O1.htm ("Children in Baltimore's
jail spend their days in grim cells lacking direct natural lighting and crawling with
cockroaches, rodents, and other vermin."); Amnesty International, Betraying the
Young: Human Rights Violations Against Children in the U.S. Justice System (1999),
at http'//www.amnesty-usa.org/rightsforall/juvenile/report/index.html (describing over-
crowding in California, Illinois, Michigan, New York City, Maine, Virginia, and
Colorado; the use of excessive physical force, shackles, chemical sprays and stun
devices in Maine, Louisiana, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Kentucky, Georgia, Florida,
Virginia, and Washington, D.C.; and the widespread use of solitary confinement in
Maine, Arizona, Louisiana, Georgia, Illinois, and Kentucky); Human Rights Watch,
High Country Lockup: Children in Confinement in Colorado 25, (1997), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/usacol (describing overcrowding, poor hygiene, lack of
drug and alcohol treatment services, use of restraints and solitary confinement, and
widespread violence in various detention facilities).
201 Cf. supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
202 See Patrick Griffin et al., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Trying Juveniles as Adults
in Criminal Court: An Analysis of State Transfer Provisions, Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention, at iii ("From 1992 through 1995, 40 States and the
District of Columbia passed laws making it easier for juveniles to be tried as adults.").
203 See Human Rights Watch, supra note 200, at apps. A-D; Amnesty
International, supra note 200.
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prosecutors complete discretion over whether to try as adults
juveniles as young as fourteen, leading some to predict that
thousands of youthful offenders will wind up in prison.20' Even
if the number of adult prosecutions rise rapidly, an Article 3
challenge based on the treatment of youthful offenders as
adults will affect a miniscule number of extradition cases2 5 and
is easily overcome by prosecutorial assurances that a relator
will be tried as a juvenile.
5. Supermax Facilities
One final area of concern involves "supermax" units or
prisons, where disruptive prisoners are kept in solitary
confinement "for an average of 23 hours per day with limited
human interaction, little constructive activity, and an
environment that assures maximum control over the
individual."21 More than thirty states operate such facilities,
with the number of prisoners kept in these conditions varying
widely across jurisdictions, from zero to twenty percent of the
incarcerated population;207 in some jurisdictions, prisoners can
be held in supermax confinement indefinitely.28 Article 3
caselaw has repeatedly commented on the unacceptability of
complete sensory deprivation,20 ' and for that very reason,
204 Proposition 21 was passed by more than sixty percent of California voters
on March 7, 2000. See Rene Sanchez & William Booth, California Toughens Juvenile
Crime Laws; Rules to Treat Young Offenders More Like Adults, WASH. POST, Mar. 13,
2000, at A3, available at 2000 WL 2218707; Mark Gladstone, Proposition 21:
Authorities Fear Fallout but Weigh Options; State and County Officials Brace for Costly
Impact on Courts and Prisons as More Juvenile Lawbreakers Are Charged as Adults,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2000, at A3; Sandra Gonzales, Prosecutor Says Voter Approval of
Prop 21 Will Not Result in Rapid Change, S.J. MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 9, 2000.205 See Keven J. Strom et al., Juvenile Felony Defendants in Criminal Courts,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report (Sept. 1998) (finding that 1,638 juveniles in
the country's seventy-five largest counties were tried as adults in 1990, 1992, and
1994, comprising one percent of all felony defendants).
2' Chase Riveland, National Institute of Corrections, Supermax Prisons:
Overview and General Considerations 1 (Jan. 1999), at http:J/www.nicic.org/pubs-
1999/014937.pdf.207 Id. at 3-4.208 Id. at 4.209 See supra note 113 and accompanying text; Nan D. Miller, Comment,
International Protection of the Rights of Prisoners: Is Solitary Confinement in the
United States a Violation of International Standards?, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 139, 165-
69 (1995) (arguing that solitary confinement in United States prisons violates the
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conditions in supermax prisons have sparked criticism and
concern from international observers, human rights groups,
scholars, and the courts.210 Assignment criteria for supermax
incarceration vary widely among jurisdictions. Where
admission depends solely on conduct within the prison
system,21' it would be difficult for an extradition relator to
claim that he faced a real risk of being the victim of cruel or
inhuman treatment. Where all new arrivals to a prison system
are housed in supermax facilities,212 or where inmates convicted
of certain crimes are automatically eligible for supermax
confinement,1 3 the defense to extradition is plausible-though
easily overcome by assurances that the relator would be
housed elsewhere.
European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights,
and the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners).210 See Nigel S. Rodley, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.411996/35, at 183 (Jan. 9, 1996) (expressing concern for treatment of prisoners
in supermax facilities in Oklahoma and California); Amnesty International, supra note
148 (describing the growth in the construction of supermax facilities and surveying
inhuman conditions in Maryland, Texas, and Indiana facilities); Human Rights Watch,
Red Onion State Prison: Super-Maximum Security Confinement in Virginia (Apr.
1999), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/redonion (describing unnecessary use of
force, sensory deprivation, the placement of non-threatening inmates in Red Onion to
fill excess capacity, and the denial of educational, vocational, and religious programs)
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Red Onion]; Human Rights Watch, Cold Storage:
Super-Maximum Security Confinement in Indiana (Oct. 1997), at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/usind (same) [Human Rights Watch, Cold Storage].
See also Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (finding that the
conditions of confinement for mentally ill prisoners at the Pelican Bay supermax
facility in California violated the Eighth Amendment); Christine Rebman, Comment,
The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from
Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567 (1999) (summarizing psychological
and sociological studies of supermax incarceration and describing the difficulty
prisoners have in litigating Eighth Amendment claims based on sensory deprivation).
211 See Human Rights Watch, Cold Storage, supra note 210, at 43 ("No judge
ever sentences a defendant to serve time in [Indiana's two supermax facilities], and no
one ever begins his prison sentence in one").
212 See Riveland, supra note 206, at 3.
213 See Human Rights Watch, Red Onion, supra note 210, at http:I/www.hrw-
.org/reports/1999/redonion ("Governor James Gilmore stated on April 9, 1999 that
felons caught with guns who qualify for a five-year mandatory sentence would be
eligible for incarceration in Red Onion or Wallens Ridge.").
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CONCLUSION: POINTS OF FRICTION, POSSIBILITIES FOR CHANGE
" Four months after the terrorist attacks on the World
Trade Center and Pentagon, Spanish authorities arrest
two men on suspicion of being members of al-Qaeda
cells that had allegedly been in direct contact with
participants in the attacks. Mohammed Atta, who is
thought to have led the September 11 attacks, had
visited a beachfront town about an hour from where the
arrests were made.214
* A respected figure in New York's Chinatown business
community flees the country after being indicted for
organizing a ring that imported illegal aliens by the
shipload. For five years, she travels under false
passports throughout Asia, South America and
Europe.215
* A chicly dressed young woman with a trace of a French
accent deposits two checks totaling more than $100,000
in a Los Angeles bank. By the time bank officials realize
that the checks were stolen and forged, she has closed
her account. Fluent in five languages, she books a first-
class ticket to Paris."'
214 See Al Qaeda Suspects Held in Spain, CNN, Jan. 19, 2002, at
http:J/www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/Europe/Ol/19/mv.Spanish.arrestsrmdex.html (last
visitedl Mar. 24, 2002).
215 See David W. Chen, People-Smuggling Suspect Is Held After 5-Year Hunt,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2000, at B3.
21 This scenario is loosely based on a current entry in the Los Angeles Police
Department's "Most Wanted List." The suspect is not believed to have fled the country.
See LAPD Most Wanted, at http'//www.lapdonline.org/getnvolved/most-wanted-
/fcdlmw_etourneauyanessa.htm (last visited May 3, 2000) (describing a young women
with a trace of a French accent and fluent in five languages, who deposited and then
withdrew $136,500 from stolen and forged checks). See also German Court Clears
Suspect's Extradition, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at B8; Leslie Wayne, U.S. Indicts a
Financier Held in Germany on 36 Counts of Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1999, at Cl;
Katherine E. Finkelstein et al, On the Run: A Special Report; A Fugitive, Hiding in
Plain Sight, Eludes a Dragnet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at Al; Joseph Kahn &
Katherine E. Finkelstein, How Bigger Didn't Turn Out to Be Better in Insurance
Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1999, at C1 (describing the Martin R. Frankel case, in
which a Greenwich, Connecticut, man suspected of bilking insurance companies of
some $200 million fled for Europe and eluded authorities for several months, during
which time he sought expert legal advice on extradition).
20021
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
" An Israeli man and his girlfriend recruit young Hasidic
Jews in Borough Park, Brooklyn, to smuggle the
popular drug Ecstasy between New York and Europe.
When several couriers are arrested, the two flee to the
Netherlands and contest extradition to the United
States.217
* A mysterious computer hacker in Eastern Europe steals
hundreds of thousands of credit card records from a
popular internet retailer. When the company refuses to
pay him $100,000, he posts the data on his own
website.215
Terrorism, alien smuggling, white collar frauds, drugs,
and computer offenses: The international character of a broad
range of crimes will increasingly confront law enforcement
agencies in the coming years. If Soering has had little effect on
the death penalty in the United States, it is nonetheless a
precedent that gives extradition defendants in each of the
above scenarios a plausible basis for staying in Europe. Even
though the European Court and all Council of Europe member
nations have an interest in not making it too easy to avoid
extradition, the success of such challenges may well hinge on a
series of thorny factual questions, such as a fugitive's gender,
age, 2 19 and physical and mental health, including history of
sexual abuse, as well as the actual prison conditions in the
jurisdiction that is charging him or her. Even claims that may
prove ultimately unsuccessful could incur high enough
transaction costs to push prosecutors to make generous plea
offers in exchange for voluntary repatriation.
217 See Alan Feuer, Sentencing a Drug Courier, Judge Rebukes the Hasidim,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2000, at B3.
218 See John Markoff, Thief Reveals Credit Card Data When Web Extortion Plot
Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at Al.2'9 Although the number of juveniles facing extradition is likely to remain
trivial, teenagers have comprised a large number of internet criminals. See, e.g., Matt
Richtel, Canada Arrests 15-Year-Old in Web Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2000, at Cl
(describing the arrest of"mafiaboy," suspected of shutting down CNN's website for two
hours); John Markoff, 2 British Youths Held in Theft of Credit Card Accounts on
Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2000, at C1 (describing two eighteen-year-olds suspected
of stealing 26,000 credit card numbers).
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Prosecutors working on extradition cases must make
careful charging decisions and must develop certain assurances
that would satisfy European standards. In terms of charging
decisions, prison conditions defenses to extradition are weaker
in federal cases. Human rights organizations have devoted
much less scrutiny to federal prisons than to state institutions.
Only a small percentage of prisoner civil rights lawsuits every
year involve federal prisons," ° and nearly seventy federal
institutions have received outside accreditation by the
American Correctional Association, to the effect that they
"provide decent living conditions, offer adequate programs, and
accommodate inmates' constitutional rights .... " Most of the
scenarios described above fit neatly into federal charging
schemes, although the woman who deposited stolen and forged
checks is wanted for violating California grand theft property
laws. Given the much documented abuses in California
women's prisons,' a federal fraud charge is more likely to
yield a successful extradition.
Although such facts obviously favor the government,
extradition relators can point to gross overcrowding of federal
high- and medium-security institutions, at fifty-six and forty-
eight percent, respectively.m There is at least anecdotal
evidence of improper use of solitary confinement in federal
facilities,' and the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary was sued over
its shackling policies.' The fact that the PLRA limits the types
of relief available to prisoners for obvious deprivations of their
rights increases the risk of abuse. Additionally, federal
women's prisons have recently faced embarrassing lawsuits
that suggest that many of the problems documented in state
20 See Marika F. Y Litras, Civil Rights Complaints in U.S. District Courts,
1990.98, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, NCJ 173427, at 5 (Jan. 2000)
("Civil rights prisoner petitions were brought primarily against State officials. Less
than 5% in any given year were brought against Federal officials.").
221 Federal Bureau of Prisons, State of the Bureau 1998, at 11, available at
http//www.bop.gov/ipapgsob98.pdf.
222 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
223 Federal Bureau of Prisons, supra note 221, at 7.
24 See, e.g., SOL WACHTLER, AFTER THE MADNESS: A JUDGE'S OWN PRISON
MEMO= (1997).
Rhonda Cook, Prison Is Called "Torture Chamber" Inmates in Atlanta
Federal Penitentiary Allege in a Lawsuit that They Were Tied to Their Beds for Days,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 27, 1998, at Dl, available at 1998 WL 3684724.
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institutions apply to the federal level as well . A federal
indictment does not end the necessity of providing evidence
that prisons meet European human rights standards.
A series of assurances by prosecutors about the
treatment of extradition relators may also facilitate the
process. One way that the European Court or Commission may
resolve controversies over prison conditions with only minimal
effect on American policy would be to accept bare assurances
that a defendant will not be subject to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment and that embassy officials from the
requested country can visit the relator periodically. Although
the European Commission has accepted such an assurance
before, that case involved a relator who had already been
extradited to the requesting country and who had not in fact
suffered any violations of his rights.227 In a case that presents
clear evidence of widespread abuse, a European human rights
tribunal might be reluctant to take such promises at face
value.
Prosecutors could also promise to house the relator in
specific prisons that meet European standards. For white
collar crimes, assurances that defendants would be placed in
minimum security facilities would probably short-circuit most
human rights defenses. Especially in jurisdictions that deal
with only the occasional extradition, placing relators in
minimum-security settings would have little effect on the
overall administration of prisons. Obviously, such assurances
would not be available for violent criminals, and because many
extradition relators have proven to be serious escape risks,
minimum-security prisons may be additionally unacceptable.
Rising prison populations may require inspections to insure
that facilities remain adequately maintained and staffed. As
populations of extradited prisoners grow and as budgetary
constraints tighten, these assurances may cross the line into
the politically unpalatable option of creating separate prison
216 See, e.g., Peddle v. Sawyer, 64 F. Supp. 2d 12, 14 (D. Conn. 1999)
(documenting abuses at the Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury, Connecticut);
Lucas v. White, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (describing sexual assaults,
harassment and unwelcome advances at the Federal Detention Center in Pleasanton,
California).
227 See X. v. Switzerland, App. No. 9012/80, 24 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
205, 219 (1980). See also Mexico v. Hurley [1997] 116 C.C.C.3d 414 (Can. 1997).
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facilities for international fugitives. If it were not hard enough
to imagine tough-on-crime legislators supporting special
treatment for a class of serious offenders, such a policy also
might encourage criminals to flee the country. Read as an
admission that other prisons do not satisfy certain minimum
human rights standards, such a policy could provide a basis for
a wave of lawsuits by the general prison population.
For policy makers in the Department of Justice, a
frictionless international extradition system necessarily entails
working for better domestic prison conditions. Increased
federal monitoring and investigation of prisons, as well as
internal audits by states, could provide important sources of
evidence for extradition tribunals. Although widespread abuses
have occurred in accredited institutions, the promotion of
voluntary minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners
such as those developed by the American Correctional
Association and the expansion of training programs such as
those offered by the National Institute of Corrections would
help foster measurable norms and benchmarks for proper
prison administration nationwide. Finally, revisions of the
PLRA's physical injury requirement and restrictions on
prospective relief, consent decrees, and attorney's fees might
keep European courts from presuming that prison abuses may
go unredressed in the United States.
If the European Court or Commission cannot force the
U.S. government to work for substantive reform, it can force
policy makers to scrutinize prison conditions. As a death
penalty precedent, Soering came to represent the sobering
truth that international norms that are antithetical to
domestic values will not take root in the United States. The
European Court of Human Rights affirmed its norms in
individual capital cases without forcing the United States to
change its overall practices. With extradition challenges based
on prison conditions, the opposite situation presents itself:
Affirming individual rights threatens to upend prison
administration in the United States. Law enforcement
authorities not only have little choice but to take seriously non-
capital extradition challenges based on prison conditions, but
they also must confront an idea that in today's political climate
2002]
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may seem counter-intuitive: The abuse of prisoners is at odds
with crime control. If prosecutors can no longer ignore the
pathologies of American prison administration, Soering's
second decade on the books will surely be more dramatic than
its first.
